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The Lawyers and the Courts
if we practice law today we must practice i t a s i t is-as it i s now
enforced. We must learn and unlearri and lay aside pre-conceived
opinions that are no longer tenable just a s we throw aside our old
clothes when they a r e no longer of service. If we would succeed we
must keep in touch with the new developments, the change of statutes,
the decisions of the higher courts, and the application of principled.
The lawyer may feel that some of these a r e wrong but what difference
to him? The rule is against him in the present case but i t may be
to his interest to invoke i t in his favor in the next.
There is a small class of lawyers t h a t always grumble and complain. A case is lost and the result is charged to the Court; upon
~t is laic!. ignorance, bias and prejudice. Courts some times rule
wrong but a lawyer has his remedy; he can have the case reviewed.
Lnnrycrs hxve often just complaints against judges but complaint.
personal animosity and want of charitable consideration of the work
of a Judge are the strongest evidence of the small caliber of the law.
A lawyer like a prize fighter should train himself to take and
receive punishment; but like the prize fighter he should by his a r t
ward off as much of this a s possible. There is no more disgusting
cshibition than a lawyer going to a judge and complaining of personal treatment.
Judgc xnit Law:-PI. each know or ought to know their place and
relations; ihe Ian. outlines and fixes these. The lawyer acting properly in his ldncc, with proper respect f o r t h e Court should be independent, know his rights 2nd maintain them; i t should always be a pleasure o i :: .'ild!;e Lo be courteous, f a i r and considerate. A lawyer
should never be a coward and ask f o r quarter, but this does not mean
that a Court should temporize with self-serving exhibitions. The
author once heard an antideluvian practioner when he was shown a
decision of the Supreme Court in point against the contention of his
argument meet i t with the reply: "Well, they a r e the only three
men that ever had any such ideas." The trouble with some grumblers is that they do not know what their clients a r e entitled to nor
when they get what is coming to them. Grumblers a s a rule stand
on archaic platitudes and misapprehension of the Law.
The judiciary of Georgia i s elected by the people. There has
becn much said for and against this mode of selecting judges. There is
no way of selecting the judges but which is open t o criticism and ob-
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jections. One thicg must be conceded; the present pian has yivezi
the State a good judiciary; our present judges will compare favorably w ~ t hthose a t any tlme iil our history. The objection urged
mainiy is that i t puts the judges in politics; t h a t the best lawyers arc
not selected. The f i r s t question here i s what is politics? If by i t
i s melint popular appreciation, a warm heart and hearty handshake;
a n ability t o appreciate and feel the needs and necessities of the people-the
grind of poverty and the struggies of the poor-and
an
earnest endeavor to administer the law to humans in a humanely
way-then
the more politics the better. If by politics is meant
only political advancement for the candidate; the getting of the office by every a r t known to dirty politics; the avowal of some special
interest to be favored in order to get votes; a regard f o r religioil
that the candidate never exhibited until he entered the campaign,
then the less of such the better. We have had candidates for the office of judge who were cold and phlegmatic by nature, but learned
in the law; who lived within themselves in the world but not of i t ;
who prided themselves on their professional ability and studied only
law and not the people; with no close friends, selfish and calculating
and whose make up would not respond t o an electric current and
when they offered themselves as candidates with a royal pose such
men were not elected. The English judiciary from the earliest timev
v;as filled from the standpoint of politics. John Marshal, Chief
Justice of the United States, appointed by John Adams, was schooled
as a politician; the present Chief Justice, a great man, was President of the United States, was defeated for re-election and afterwards appointed to his high office; Chief Justice T a f t is a great
ex'ample of a n able, high toned, outstanding patriotic American but
these grumblers would call him a politician. Consider other appointments to that high Court; Chief Justice Taney served a n apprenticeship under Andrew Jackson a s a politician.
The writer does not know any ideal plan to select the Judiciary:
he was elected a Superior Court judge three times by Legislature
without opposition and twice by the people with opposition and quit
of his own motion. Judges a r e now elected by the people and i t
would be better f o r the grumblers to go to the polls and make their
ideas concrete rather than to attack the present system.
A court is made up of its officers, judge, attorneys, clerks,
sheriff and jurors. In the proper disposition of business each of
these must function properly. There is little complaint of the failure of the clerks and sheriffs; a s a rule they a r e good officers and
discharge their duties. Comparatively few verdicts a r e set aside a s
improper verdicts. While sitting in the Supreme Court, I wrote i n
the case of Allison v. Richmond Railroad Co., 89 Ga. Page 572:
"Whoever has had any experience with juries must concede
t h a t they endeavor to do right. They take questions of fact in a
practical way, unimpeded by the legal fetters t h a t restrain a professional mind. They may not find sometimes a s a court would
find. The reply is, the law has left this work to them. If they do
their work fairly under the rules, courts ought not to disturb their
verdicts. In "Trial by Jury," by Forsyth, he says: "It was said
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or socrates that he first drew philosophy from the clouds, and made
i t walk upon the earth. And of the civil jury i t may be also said
that i t i s an institution which draws down the knowledge of the laws
to the level of popular comprehension." From this standpoint, ifi
a practical way, by practical men, verdicts a r e made.
Juries a r e changing bodies and not often do the same jurors sit
in different cases. The work of juries is characterized by a n obligation to duty and a n endeavor to find proper verdicts. The greater
number of cases a r e reversed on the charges and rulings of the
judges and for these in most instances the lawyers a r e responsible.
Lawyers a r e loyal to their clients and often on doubtful questions
their contentions a r e not sustained. The Higher Courts must lay
down general rules applicable to the instant cases which makes a precedent to he afterwards fol!owed. It would be unfortunate if this
were otherwise for then there would be no certainty in the subsequent trial of cases.
There a r e lawyers and lawyers. They have been the butt of
many a story. Dickens tells us of Sergeant Buzfuz who gained his
case over his opponent by open hypocrisy and diaphanous pretensions
which have long since been overworked and placed in the discard.
Buzfuz won a verdict in a case that was fabricated from s t a r t to finish. The legal profession in current literature is lambasted by hal1baked writers about fictitious cases drawn from their imaginations
a s t o all the proceedings; their helpless dummies do their alloted
parts and their manikins perform to order and complete satisfaction.
The writers manufacture their stuff to sell-it has to be something
out of the usual-something that in the minds of the publishers will
attract and pander to a certain morbid stratum of the public eager
f o r something to sustain their preconceived opinions. Lawyers let
such stuff pass; their shoulders a r e broad and they can bear it. Let
one of these critics get his shins skinned or toes mashed by a railroad or if he sees a long shot to get some money out of the estate
of a distant relative he hunts up a lawyer. While the writer was
upon the Superior Court bench he overheard a certain self esteemed
Socrates discoursing against electing a lawyer to the legislature.
He prided himself on being a n American citizen, that he had no use
f o r courts nor lawyers; t h a t he never had a lawsuit but attended t o
his own business; t h a t courts and lawyers were a useless burden upon
the people. A few weeks later he came with a lawyer to my office
ahunger and athirst f o r an injunction. It seems he had found himself in another latitude. The writer knows of no business nor profession where every one following i t is a saint and f i t to be tranaInted; a t least this could not be insisted on f o r the lawyers. Lawyers could be divided into three classes: There Ts the older and more
experienced class t h a t have been longest a t the bar. The men t h a t
started with them-those
t h a t be!onged to the third stratum-the
guerilla class-have lonx s i x " . been eliminated and weeded out. This
o!der class has been trie.'; o u t ; i t !?as a1u~a.v~
nractfced law a s a proThey have the
fession; i t has regarded its traditions and ci!!ir.s.
confidence of the public and a r e ful! of bu!:iness. No c!ass o r profession can claim a. greater percentzige of honorable, patriotic men:
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they have the confidence of everybody and do the greater part of the
important work of the courts. There is another stratum that is
separate from the third class and will not mix with it. These a r e
the young men that have entered the profession t o practice law and
observe the ethics that obtain among all true lawyers. They have
studied hard in their preparation; they work, are courteous and have
an ambition to fully and fairly discharge their duties to the court
and their obligation to their clients. They leave their clients satisfied and are respected by their fellow members. These young fellows
are the coming men; honorab!e and high toned, they condemn a man
that would act otherwise. The third class base their claims upon the
fact that they have been admitted to the E a r and have licenses to
practice. Measuring them by their knowledge of the law and there
work there is presented an inscrutable proposition as to how they
ever achieved any such result. They do not know what their clients
a r e entitled to nor when they have gotten what is coming to them.
They glory in being distinguished by the appointment of the judge
to defend some colored brother that has been caught in another's
hen roost or has slaughtered a hog that did not be!ong to him. This
class i s strong on oratory-of
the loud, rancous and strident kind
that makes the welkin ring. It matters not what the evidence is
one of these stresses the presumption of innocence-the reasonable
doubt-but greatest of all the defendant's statement. When the jury
brings in a verdict of guilty he is satisfied fully that he has made a
great effort but cannot understand and is a t loss as to why the jury
could find against his speech. Some of this class will tell anybody
with any kind of a case that they can gain i t ; that there is no trouble
about it. They infest the jails; they chase ambulances; they solicit
cases. Such men are not lawyers; they are guerillas; they live off
of the ignorant and have lofty ideas RS t o fees-they
grab everything in their reach.
We have a world of law books; the publishers continuously grind
them out; new editions; new text books with a rehash of old principles. The State Reports and Federal Reports contain little beyond
the application of old r@es. We have new laws that must be construed. The courts and the legal profession a r e charged with a lack
of progress. Our attention is called to the industrial world with its
standardized mass production; to the invention of the radio, the developmept of electricity, the automobile, the great strides in transpor-tation and to the advancements made in the a r t of killing people in
war. We are asked why the enforcement of the law does not keep
step with all this progress? The answer is we have the laws and
they a r e easily applied if the courts could get t,he facts before them.
We must go to the scene of the murder to get the witnesses; to the
place of the hold up which was planned by shrewd men as to time
and place to prevent identification and rely on evidence unforseen by
them to convict them. Much of the evidence in such cases must
come from their companions in crime who do not hesitate a t perjury.
I n such cases we cannot choose our witnesses. Good citizens have
no part in the commission of crime; they cannot 5e witnesses because
they are not there. We must ordinarily get the witnesses from the
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criminal class and depend on them for the evidence upon which to try
the criminals. In the Courts perjury runs riot. There are few indictments for perjury; i t is present almost every day in all the
courts. Some witnesses who think they are honest fall f a r short
when their evidence is properly weighed. Some psychologists insist
that there is no one who has no prejudice or bias. I will not discusa
this; there is too much to be said. I am reminded of a story: A
good church member-a pillar of the community and who was pointed out to the young a s an examplar of everything that a n upright
man should be was put upon his voir dire a s a juror in a murder
case. He answered all the questions to qualify him. He was asked
if he had any conscientious scruples against capital punishment. He
answered: "Not in this case." The rich and the poor, vice and virtue, good men and bad men go upon the witness stand. From much
lying, perjury, in conflict with honest evidence courts must endeavor
to discover the truth. The Lord failed t o get the truth from Adam
and Eve in the garden of Eden. Human nature has always been th5
same. The human heart is desperately wicked and deceitful above
all things. If the courts are to make progress they must have the
facts to which to apply the law. This must come from a regeneration of the human; he must be brought to a realization of his obligations and responsibilities. As to how i t is to he done the writer does
not know. In the middle ages torture was used. Psychiatrists have
lately lent a hand but have not succeeded.
The Bar owes courtesy to the Judge. This should be reciprocal.
The lawyer is bound to give i t to the Judge, not so much to the man
that holds the office. Lawyers are ready to credit the Judge with all
the good that is in him. This does not mean the adulation of the
sycophant on the part of the lawyer nor the hollow meaningless compliments on the part of the Judge. Courtesy is a s cheap and easy a s
the breathing of the air. It should betray no effort and be as a
matter of course. A Judge should expect it and never be driven to
demand it from the men who appear before him. The inherent power of a court over the Bar should sleep like the lightning and strike
only to hurt. Like the electric chair, i t should be kept out of sight
and used only when needed. A Judge should not talk too much. The
stories of his forensic triumphs, the history of his legal conquests,
the annals of his family, though they may be cherished memories
with him, do not interest the public. It may endure them, but i t
does not follow that they are appreciated.
Men have come and gone; i t is useless for a man t o make himself out a prodigy. No Judge should glory in the idea of trying to
present himself as a terror; his breathings and threatenings should
be left off. Such things are not necessary to the assertion of his
office. It has been said that we know nothing of a man until we
give him power; but no Judge should offer himself a s an illustration
of this saying. Every Judqe ought to be a Christian, but i t is dangerous for him t o claim too much religion.
A Judge of the Superior Court has more power as such Judge
than any other officer of the State. This power affects the rights
and liberties of the people; the laws that protect these are adminis-
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tered by him. To properly discharge the function of this high office, it is not only necessary that a Judge should endeavcr to do
right, but also that he should bring to the discharge of his duties a
knowledge of the law and understanding of the construction of the
laws as passed upon by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, along with these great qualities of head and heart.
He offers himself as such officer upon the undertaking to execute the laws as they are written, and to exercise the judicial function as delegated to him by the people.
A Judge is in the limelight; his reasons are weighed; his motives are considered. He is given the discretion in many matters,
and this should never be looked upon by him as simply the power
to carry out without restraint his preconceived ideas. The people of
the circuit and the lawyers that represent them have a right to assume that such discretion will be exercised in a legitimate way and
within the limits conferred by law. He should not regard the matter of discretion a s arbritary and a carte blanche unlimited and unrestrained. The discretion should never be exercised under the
same circumstances one way a t one time and a different way a t another time; i t should be based upon some rule of reason that can be
understood by the bar and the people. A Judge should never throw
away his discretion. I t is given to the Judge and not to the man;
i t is not given to be controlled and exercised, by prejudices or individual ideas. If such be true, the exercise of discretion would be
given to the man. The greatest tyrant in the world is the one that
writes his laws so high that they cannot be read or when the law is
enforced from a standpoint of caprice that cannot be anticipated.
To undertake to define egoism from either a metaphysical or
ethical standpoint would lead one f a r a field. The phase of i t discussed here makes such a consideration unnecessary. I t has been
defined in philosophy as "A term applied to any view that was supposed to make the individual self the only reality knowable." As
considered here, it is applicable in a few inst~ncesto that characteristic development of a few judges and lawyers that labor under the
delusion that i t is necessary to put themselves too much in evidence
on any and all occasions.
Few judges are afflicted with it, some lawyers suffer from it,
and the public helplessly endure it. In a Judge, its existence is manifested by much talk; by a continual assertion of his power and authority as if his commission were contested; by finding fault unnecessarily; by criticising the work and pleadings of lawyers and endeavoring to leave a presumptive inference of their sloth and
ignorance.' The use of lung power a t a high pressure is one of it3
symptoms.
An acute attack sometimes deprives a Judge of all ideas of courtesy, or at least he shows none, and displays displeasures a t everybody and everything. There is but one effectual remedy for a Judg,?
that has a chronic case of egoism and that is to apply the proper
treatment a t the polls. It i s unfortunate for a lawyer to suffer
from egoism. I t might be defined when applied to him a s a continual assertion of the possession of extraordinary ability and know<
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ledge where i t is not conceded; he deals in trite fundamentals and
broad platitudes as controlling and which are handed out in a patronizing way as only the odds and ends of his common stock; these by
ponderous assertion he insists are applicable in every proposition
presented; opposing counsel to his mind can do nothing right; with a
rotund voice he wears a pleasing smile and beams upon every one
who does things to suit him; he divides humanity into two classes,
fools and rascals. The fools are those that oppose him and do not
agree with him; the rascals are those that do not assent to anything
and everything that he wants; he has a liberal supply of adjectives.
In his opinion, shadowed forth by his activities, he is a great man
and a wonder. Suppose for a moment that we should have a Judge
on the Bench laboring under egoism and a Bar, each member of
which was down with the disease, just think of such a spectacle.
Everybody knowing everything-no one knowing anything,--everybody talking, nobody listening; i t would be a panegyric to call such
a Court a pandemonium.
A lawyer with an incipient case of egoism is usually benefitted,
if not entirely cured, by the atmosphere of a Bar that properly apprcciates such claims and performances. Occasionally it happens that
by a happy prod from opposing counsel through the armor joints of
his self importance he is brought to a realization of the fact that
lawyers are practical and take such pretensions a t their true worth.
Whilst egoism is prevalent, i t is by no mertns epidemic and sometimes one case has the happy effect of leading all others to take proper precautions to ward off the disease.
One of the greatest obstacles to the dispatch of business and the
enforcement of the law is the flood of eloquence that overwhelms the
courts. I t knows no bounds and has no limits. I t makes no difference as to the character of the case or the amount of evidence; it is
part of the regular bill of fare and must be endured. Under the
rules the judge is helpless whether it is logical or illogical. Much
of it is f a r fetched inferences drawn from the imagination. The evidence shows one case and quite another is argued; in fact the idea in
some places is abroad that the determination of issues of fact depends
entirely on the concluding speech, often made up of garbled evidence
and reckless assertion. Those who indulge this way ought to have a
regeneration and become imbued with the spirit of the law and the
relation that an Attorney bears to the court. Much of this could be
controlled if the judge would enjorce the rules; the opposing col.in~el
dare not object before a judge who is lax in their enforcement. The
object of all legal investigation is the discovery of the truth; in some
places this is disregarded and instead the object is to gain cases, by
any means fair or foul.
Code Section 4965 provides :It is the duty of attorneys a t law-To employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to them, such means only as are
consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judges or
juries by any artifice or false statement of the law.
To abstain from all offensive personalities, and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a p a d y or a witness,
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unless required by the justice of the cause with which they are charged.
These duties set out in the Code seems to have been forgotten by
some lawyers; a t least they are disregarded.
Again Code Sections 6261 and 6262 are a s follows:Arguments of counsel shall be confined t o the law and the facts
involved in the case then before the court, on pain of being considered
i n contempt; and in all civil cases questions of law shall be argued
exclusively to the court, and questions of fact to the jury. Code
Sec. 6261.
No attorney shall be permitted to interrupt another, while addressing the court or jury, except to correct him in a misstatement
of evidence, or misrepresentation of the position of counsel, upon
pain of being considered in contempt; and such interruption, when
made, shall always be addressed to the court, and never under any circumstances to the counsel. Code Sec. 6262.
The following is part of a n opinion written by Chief Justice
Richard B. Russell, now of the Supreme Court of Georgia, who wrote
i t in the case of Pelham & Havana R. Co. v. Elliott, 11 App. 630. At
that time Judge Russell was one of the Judges of the Court of Appeals. This opinion presents the subject of argument in a pointed
and incisive way and presents the matter clearly.
"The rule is, that it is contrary to law for counsel to comment upon facts
not proven. He represents his client-he is the substitute of his client; whatever the client may do fn the conduct of his cause; therefore, his counsel may
do. I n relation to his liberty of speech, the largest and most liberal freedom
is allowed, and the law protects him in it. The right of discussing the merits
of his cause, Both a s to the law and the facts, is indispensable to every party;
the same r i ~ h tappertains to his counsel. The range of discussion is widevery wide. He is entitled to be heard in argument upon every question of law
that may arise in the cause; in his addresses to the jury i t is his right to descant upon the facts proven or admitted in the pleadings; to arraign the conduct of parties, impugn, excuse, justify, or condemn motives, so far as they
are developed in evidence: assail the credibi1i.t~of witnesses, when t h a t is im~ e a c h e d,by direct evidence, or by the inconsistency or incoherence of his testimony, his manner of testifying, his appearance, o r by circumstances. His illustrations may be a s various ai are the resources of his genius; his argumentation a s full and profound as his learning can make it; and he may, if he will,
give ply to his wit, or wIng to his imagination. To his freedom of speech, however, there are some limitations. .
It has been found difficult to prescribe
a legal limitation to the lawyer's liherty of speech in the performance of hls
duties in a cause. Tha.t the discussions should be free is perfectly obvious;
and even abuses should be tolerated, rather than a privilege so valuable should
be abridged. W e fell the delicacy of the ground upon which we tread, and are
solicitous of being understood as carrying our present ruling no farther than to
cover the precise question made in the assignment. . . . Statements of facts
not proven, and comments thereon, are outside of a cause; they stand legally
;?-relevant to the matter in question, and a r e therefore not pertinent. If not
. Trial by jury!
pertinent, they a r e not within the privilege of counsel.
How imperfect a privilege would that be, if the forms of law were abandoned
-if the rules of evidence were disregarded! An essential element in the trial
by jury i s that their verdict shall be rendered according to the f x t s of the
case, legally produced to them. They are sworn to give their verdicts according to evidence, and if they find without evidence, or against evidence, a new
trial will <begranted. They cannot even render a verdict upon knowledge within thecr own breasts; but if a juryman has knowledge of facts pertinent to the
issue, he may be sworn. The law, with great carefulness, prescribes rules by
which facts are to be submitted to the jury. Testimony must be relevantthe best evidence the nature of the case admits must be produced; hearsay Is
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excluded; interest in the witness will disqualify, etc.; and .by our own constitution ,in criminal cases t h e witnesses a r e to ;be confronted with the prisoner.
He has in all cases the right of cross-examination. All these and many more
rules are prescribed for the ascertainment aT t h e truth of those facts upon
which verdicts a r e to be rendered. The law to be administered may depend
upon the facts proven. E x facto oritur jus. 'And if the fact,' writes Blackstone, 'is perverted or misrepresented, the law which arises from thence will
unavo*bly be unjust or partial; and in order to prevent this, it is necessary
to set right the fact, and establish the truth contended for, *by appealing t o
some mode of probation or trial, which the law of the country has ordained
for a criterion of truth and falsehood.' 3 Black Com. 330. When counnel
a r e permitted t o state facts in argument and to comment upon them, the usage
of the courts regulating trials is departed from, the laws of evidence are violaed, and the Pull benefit of trial by jury is therefore denied. I t may be said
in answer to these views, that the statements of counsel a r e not evidence; that
the court is bound so t o instruct the jury, and that they a r e sworn to render
a verdict only according t o the evidence. Whilst alJ this L true, yet the dfeet is to bring the statements of counsel to bear upon the verdict with more
or less force, according to c:rcumstances; and if they in any degree influence
the finding, the law is violated, and the purity and impartiality of the trial
are tarnished and weakened. If not evidence, then without doubt the jury
have nothing t o do with them, and the lawyer no right to make them. And
just here the argument might be rested. It is not reasonable to believe that
the jury will disregard them. They may struggle to disregard them; they may
think t h a t they do disregard them, and still be led involuntarily to shape their
verdict under their influence. That influence will be greater or less, according to the character of counsel, his skill and adroitness in argument, and the
natumlness with which the statements stand connected with other facts and
circumstances in the case. To a n extent not definable, yet to a dangerous extent, they are evidence, not given under oath-without cross-examination, and
irrespective of all those precautionary rules by which competency is tested.
"In this case the statement and comments had reference to the character
and credibility of the witness. I know of no rule of law which authorizes the
credibility of a witness t o ,be impeached or fortified thus. The manner of a t tacking o r defending the character of a witness is fixed by law; and fixed,
among other things, that he may not be subject t o irregular and irrensponsible
assaults upon his veracity and fairness. He. as well as parties and counsel,
has rights, which it is the duty of the court to protect. I t were a cruel injus.
tice to permit his character to be driven to and fro like the shuttlecock, by
outside statements of counael. Where shall the license stop? If allowed
against t h e credibility of a wXness, then with equal reason they a r e to be al.
lowed a s touching the merits of theissue. If crimination is granted, recrimination cannot be refused. If statements on one side a r e permitted, counterstatements on the other cannot be denied. If allowed to me of the highest
honor, they cannot be clenied to those few to be found in all professions. destitute of all honorable principle. The concession, carried out in its legitimate
consequences, mould convert the stern, inflexible law and order of a court of
justice, into confus?on, uncertainty and Injustice."

In the 10 Ga. 410 the Supreme Court said:It is not necessary to speak of the rights and obligations of counsel, so
far as concerns their relation to theid clients; except to say, that it is unquestionably the right and duty of counsel to bring to the view of the Court. for
'ts determination, a n y point of law, which properly springs out of the cause,
and which they may think important for t h e interest of their clients. Thcy
are in Court for that purpose; they a r e ;bound to observe closely, to labor diligently and to know thoroughly, in order that they may secure the determination of the rights of their client, according to law. The 6eautilful theory of a
trial is this: Both sides a r e represented by counsel, t h a t their rights may be
settled, not by a r t or chicane, or the tricks of the orator, but according to the
law. I t is therefore, the duty of counsel t o present to the Court the points
which he conceives a r e in favor of his client; and it is his right to be heard in
argument to sustain them: and when presented, it is the duty of the Court
to pass upon them, if they grow out of the case, but not otherwise: and of t h a t
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he is to judge. I f he declines t o pa= upon a principle thus moved, and it
springs out of the case, such declining is error, and if a n appellate tribunal
finds .t in favor of the party moving it, a new trial will be awarded. A s officers of the Court, the duties of counsel a r e not in conflict with those which
devolve upon him as the representative of a party. They a r e the friends of
the Court, enlisted with him in the sublime work of discovering truth, and
dea1:ng out justice between man and man. I t is not the duty of counsel to
suggest points of law which are against his client; ,but it is his duty to insist
upon no point which he knows Yo be contrary to law. Whilst judgment belongs alone to the Judge--enlightenment is the province of the lawyer, and I
apprehend that no Judge can be found so presumptuously vain, or so flagrantly unjust, as not to recognize, and that too with grateful emotions, the aid
which he derives, in the discharge of duties more solemn than belongs to any
other functionary, from a n able bar.

From 10 Ga. 521p:I would be the last man living to seek to abridge freedom of speech, and
no one witnesses v i t h more unfeigned pride and pleasure than myself, the
effusions of forensic eloquence, daily exhibited in our Courts of Justice. For
the display of intellectual power, our b a r speeches are equalled ,by few, surpassed by none. Why, then, resort to such a suberfuge? Does not history,
ancient and modern-nature, art, science and philosophy-the
moral, po1:tical.
financial, commercial and legal-all open to counsel, their rich and inexhnust.
ible treasures, for illustration?
Here, under the fullest inspiration of excited genius, they may give vent
to their glowing conceptions, in thoughts that breathe and words that burn.
Nay more, giving reins to their imagination, they may permit the sp:rit of
their heated enthusiasm to swing and sweep beyond the flaming ,bounds of
space and time-extra flammantia moenia mundi. But let nothing tempt them
to pervert the testimony, or surreptitiously array before the Jury, facts which,
whether true or not, have not been proven.

We have from 27 Ga. 210:We do not know that more need be said, as to the proper conduct of counsel in arguing causes. We find it difficult to confine them to the record in
this Court, and it is more Cifficult we doubt, to in the Court below. F o r there,
i t is not always agreed as to what has or has not been proven; there may be
a n honest mistake as to that, while here i t is a matter of record, about which
there need be no misapprehension. To depart from the testimony, much more,
voluntarily t o pervert or misrepresent or add to it, is a great wrong; and to say
nothing worse, it leads to those unseemly altercations which so seriously disturb the decorum and dignity of Courts. For myself, I envy not the success
of those who achieve their triumphs in this way. I intend this a s a general
remark. and not for the counsel in this case.

There obtains a divergence of ideas in the argument of cases.
The difference is especially noticeable in comparing the practice in
one circuit with that of another. Often one would imagine t h a t all
rules had been abrogated or that h e had gotten in a foreign jurisdiction. Some time ago the writer-found himself in a Superior Court
where the case of the State vs. Sam Hill charged with chicken stealing was on trial. Col. Josiah Singer represented the defendant.
Col. Josiah Singer boasted that he never looked inside of a college; that he was a self made man; that he and the Lord alone were
responsible for the making; and that in so as he was concerned he
was satisfied with the job. The speech was so unique; its piercing
periods made a lasting impression on my memory. I found myself
taking notes; that night I filled them out a s best I could and next
day I submitted them to the Colonel. With a few amendations he
approved them. I am not willing that this piece of eloquence should
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be lost to posterity and for this reason I have inserted i t as illustrating one school of oratory in the court room. I pride myself on the
fact that I have been able to save this classic from oblivion. While
Col. Josiah Stringer has not been consulted as to this publication I
feel sure from his good nature, and love of notoriety he will not object as the annals of the courts would be incomplete without it. The
Col. considers this one of his greatest efforts. More than this Col.
Josiah Stringer now has his eyes turned heavenward, gazing a t the
stars and reading from them a great political future. I t is to be
regretted that the future career of this great patriot is to depend
upon the uncertain shuffle of the cards in the political game. He
has the best wishes of many admiring friends who hope that luck and
Providence will be kind to him.
Col. Singer sat in his office. He was through with his work
for the day. He threw his feet upon his desk and meditated. Many
things presented themselves for consideration and first of all his
exchequer was low and had to be replenished. He concluded, after
much thought, he had not been assertive and did not put himself sufficiently in evidence. He knew he had great ability and circumstances
had been such that he had not been able to show it. He concluded
that it had been his fault and with a fixed determination to place
himself a t the head of the Bar in Center City he arose, closed the
door and betook himself to his lodgings.
Bright and early the next morning Col. Josiah Singer went down
to the jail to see the Sheriff. The Col. used few words but these
were to the point and there was an agreement by which the sheriff
was to have the inmates of the jail to employ the Col. and in return
the Col. was to give the Sheriff one-half of his fees. The compact
having been made the Sheriff carried Col. Josiah Singer to the cell
door of Sam Hill a colored citizen who was awaiting a trial for chicken stealing. There was a proper introduction and the Sheriff told
what a great lawyer Col. Josiah Singer was and what he could do.
Sam a t once relieved the situation by offering Col. Josiah ten dollars
of the first money he got after he "put him on the ground." The
Col. was inquisitive and asked Sam how much cash he had and what
he could pay down. Sam in a mournful voice prompted doubtless by
the complex of his indigence and condition told the Col. that he did
not have a nickel-not even a cent. The Col. had a big heart-and
an abundance of human sympathy and he told Sam that he would
accept the employment, that his oath of office required him never t9
reject for a consideration personal to himself the cause of the dcfenseless and oppressed. Sam said he was certainly "pressed" and
was glad de Lord had sent him a friend. Mr. Jones 'cuses' me of
takin his chickens-just two little pullets and an old rooster and
I'll tell you Kurnel fore God if I was a t de roost dat night I was sure
walkin in my sleep.
Now Sam stick to the truth as you have told me and I will sure
put you on the ground, said Col. Josiah Singer in a tone of assurance.
Court came. The Sheriff brought in Sam Hill: The Judge
called the case before Sam was seated. No answer: the Judge asked
Sam if he was the defendant. Sam replied-Nor Sir, Judge 1's not
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the fendant; 1's de gentlemen what stole de chicken. Col. Josiah wae
attracted and coming to the front informed the court that the defendant was ignorant and what he meant was that he was accused of
stealing the chickens.
The jury was stricken and the Solicitor General introduced hie
evidence. On the night in question Mr. Wade Smith swore he had
the toothache; was awake about one o'clock and heard a dog bark and
a chicken squall. He got his flashlight went to the hen roost where
he flashed his light and found the defendant Sam Hill with two pullets in one hand and a rooster in the other; ready to travel. Had
Sam put chickens back on the roost; carried Sam down to jail.
Col. Josiah Singer now embraced his opportunity to give the witness a thorough cross-examination, and to sift the witness:
How many chickens did you have? I had up to a few weeks ago
forty-seven but Sam Hill or some one else has stolen them all but
the three Sam had.
Do you know Sam got the other chickens?
All I know I ran a nigger off from the hen roost about three
weeks before this with a bag and from his build and size as he rav
under the electric light in my opinion it was Sam; I found next morning four chickens missing. HOG old were your chickens?
I would say the pullets were about four months old and it was an
old rooster.
Are you sure i t was the defendant the night you swear he had
the three chickens?
Sure I do; I have known him a long while.
Tell the jury how you have come to know him.
I was on a jury in this court last year that convicted him of
stealing a hog from Jim Rhodes.
I s i t not a fact that if you saw the defendant that night he waa
walking in his sleep, when you caught him and carried him down to
jail?
Sam was wide awake as he is now and talked to me as I carried
him to jail.
What did he say to you as a part of the res gestae?
He told me in the hen house that he hoped I would "Scuse" him
as the preacher was a t his house and he wanted the chickens for his
breakfast.
Sam made his statement. He said if he was a t dat hen roost
dat night i t was sure while he was walking in his sleep and he never
woke up until he was in jail.
Col. Josiah Singer not having introduced evidence was entitled to
the conclusion. The Solicitor made a short statement and stopped.
He told the jury they were intelligent men and he would leave the
case with them. Col. Josiah arose with a majestic air; his dress
was perfectly appropriate. He wore a long black coat that he buttoned up and adjusted his red cravat. He felt his responsibility.
His a r t was all his own. He began in dulcet tones; soon i t was a
crescendo attended with physical manifestations. He said :Gentlemen of the jury. It is with trepidation on account of the
great responsibility that I come before you to argue in behalf of
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the liberty of this American citizen who a t this time on account of
this malicious prosecution is now in durance vile. My appearance
here is in response to a call of duty to which the good Lord helping
me I will always respond.
I meet you a s a jury in this case whom the jury commissioner,s
of this county have selected as upright and intelligent men. From
your attention and alertness they have made no mistake. The Lord
always writes the good heart and intelligence of a man on his face.
You bear his handwriting; he has stamped i t on your brows. I have
practiced law in many States; I have appeared before many juries in
my extended practice and I never stood before a jury with greater
confidence than now. I am fully persuaded that you will do you1
duty though the heavens fall, and remove from his character thesc
aspersions that this American citizen stole two little pullets and a11
ancient rooster.
The Superior Court is a great court; i t has general jurisdiction;
i t has great powers; you men pay taxes to support i t for its legitimate purposes-to try murder cases-rape
cases-hold-up
cases,
burglaries and like cases. Has i t come to pass in Center City, the
home of wealth and intelligence, of churches and schools, of happy
homes and great industrial enterprises that your Solicitor General
would degrade its powers and take the time and attention of this
court a t a cost of one hundred dollars a day and clog the wheels or
justice with such a case as this; to prosecute an American citizen on
perjured evidence for stealing two little pullets and an ancient rooste r ; to jeopardize the liberty of an American citizen with such a case
is a damnable, diabolical shame. I have read all of the U. S. Reports,
your State Reports and I defy the Solicitor General to show me a
case where any Solicitor General heretofore has brought an indictment against an American Citizen for stealing two little pullets
and an ancient rooster.
I have told you of my readings and of my efforts to know the law.
I found a case decided by John Marshal, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. He was the boss of the law and he decided: "De minimis lex non curat." As some of you may not be
Latin scholars, a s I am, I will translate i t for you-"The
law does
not bother about trifles." If John Marshal were here, and I am sorry
he is not, he would tell this prosecutor, this Solicitor General, "to heil
with your case about two little pullets and an ancient rooster." They
would hide their faces and slink out of this Court House in disgract!
and shame. Yes, if Old John Marshal was here today he would drive
them out of this temple of Justice just like Jesus Christ drove the
money changers out of the temple a t Jerusalem.
The Solicitor General made no speech. He did not dare to attempt to argue the case. He just told you that you were intelligent
men and he would leave the case with you. Gentlemen think of such
a speech. He told you that you were intelligent men. You knew
that; everybody within the sound of my voice knew i t ; the judge on
the bench knew i t and the Solicitor General is trying to raise an issue
as to your intelligence. Gentlemen of the jury I measure my words
and Col. Josiah Singer is responsible here or anywhere else for what
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he says. I say here and now that a more attrocious insult was never
flung in the face of a jury; these are my sentiments.
Again he says that he will leave the case with you. This is a
wonderful statement. He seems to have been hesitating whether he
would toat i t off or leave you the bag to hold. I do not blame him for
leaving i t with you; he wanted to get rid of it. He wanted to make
you responsible for his prostitution of the law in this case where he
has brought a free, liberty loving, American Citizen before this great
court on the flimsy charge of stealing two pullets and an ancient
rooster. He leaves i t with you, of course he does and is glad to wash
his dirty hands of such a case.
The Legislature in its wisdom passed an act which provides that
every American Citizen upon the trial of a criminal case has a right
to make to the court and jury such statement as he deems proper in
his own defense not under oath and to which the jury can give such
force as they deem proper and the jury can believe it in preference
to the sworn testimony of the States witnesses.
Gentlemen this is the Magna Charta of liberty; it was made for
just such a case as this. I t says the jury can believe i t in preference to the testimony of the States w i t n e s s e e a n y number of State's
witnesses. Here there is only one State's witness. Yes you can
believe it in preference. The idea of liberty is the foundation of our
laws; the pearl of great price. You are given the liberty to believe
i t and liberty that carries with it the burden of responsibility. It
is your duty to believe i t over the evidence of the trumped up yarn
of this perjured prosecutor, which sounds like the midnight ravinga
of some distempered hash-eater suffering with pains in his stomach.
Of course you will believe it and turn this American Citizen loose.
In this case there was a special interposition of Providence. The
Lord took care of this defendant. He was walking in his sleep. He
told you, this in his statement. This prosecutor did not dare to go
back on the stand and deny it.
The Lord looked after him. Down a t the end of the street that
passes the house of this prosecutor is the river swift and deep. If
this defendant was in that chicken house that night somnambulisitn,
and walking in his sleep he was there by a special interposition of
Providence for the Lord directed him there. If this had not happened he would have walked on down that street and tumbled in tha
river and been drowned. I repeat again that this American citizen
ought to thank the Lord for this special Providence and protection.
This perjured prosecutor says he found him in the chicken house. I
ask did he hurt the chicken house; he didn't tear down any door b i
bbreak any window; he didn't steal any chickens because he says he
made him hang them back upon the roost. There never was a mora
malicious, damnable, diabolic persecution instituted against ah American citizen and all for two little pullets and one ancient rooster. God
save the mark.. Gentlemen of the jury there is a time when duty
calls; when i t will not down. YOUmay squelch and resist it but your
consciences will upbraid you and you will be indicted on that great
day of judgment when the ruler of Heaven and earth presides on the
great white throne.
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In the World War 2,000,000 of our young men went across to
f a r off France a t the call of duty to fight for liberty and to make
the world safe for democracy. Our great grey war ships loaded down
with men and cannon scoured the seas a t the call of duty to help in
the battle for liberty. Julius Caeser marched to the Rubicon and
those Roman Morons dared him to cross but in the face of duty he
jumped in with his clothes on. At the battle of Trafalgar Nelson
commanded the English fleet against that of the French. Nelson
hung a t his masthead the signal, "England expects every man to do
his duty." The sailors were inspired; for duty they fought like
tigers and wiped the French fleet off the ocean.
Now George Washington was not a saint; when i t was necessary he would cuss a little. When he started to fight the battle and
capture the Hessians a t Trenton, as history tells us, he came to the
Delaware River which was full of ice and i t was a cold and snow,.
night. Some of his generals thought the night too bad and did not
come. Some of his staff advised him to give i t up as the weather
and ice were too rough. George gave the order: "Get across,"
damn the weather and the ice." They went and gained the battle of
Trenton. He acted from a sense of duty. When George cut his
father's cherry tree he owned i t to his face from a sense of duty.
Many a father would have spanked him but from a sense of duty he
didn't. Speaking to a jury as intelligent men as you are, I have no
idea I am telling you what you do not know, but I am simply call in^
your attention to these examples of duty we get from history. As
you know, history teaches by example.
,
Now, Gentlemen of the Jury, from all these examples I ask you,
I beseech you, to do your duty. Give this American citizen a safe de.
liverance from this infamous and malicious charge of stealing these
pullets and an anchient rooster by returning a verdict of not guilty.
While Col. Josiah Singer was delivering this great speech he
intoned and controlled his voice in a most remarkable way. At one
time he used i t like the plaint of a song bird bereaved of her lost
mate. . Again i t was raucous and strident as if he defied everything
and everybody; then i t reached the sublime like the rolling thunder;
it was a great effort.
At this point Col. Josiah Singer stopped and seemed to pull himself together. He straightened himself up; made sure his coat was
buttoned and adjusted his red cravat. You could have heard a pin
drop in the court room, i t was a tense moment; there was an air if
expectancy. I t foreboded something was coming. Then Col. Josiah
Sanger began :Rome rose on the ruins of Greece to waive her scepter over the
subjected world. The mighty Hannibal raised his arm against her
and she crushed it. The captured flags of the conquered nations
waived from her walls as emblems of her asserted power. I t was
then that Virgil strung his lyre to sing of the fame of Aenaes; Cicero shook the forum with the thunders of his elo~uenceand struck
terror into the hearts of the tyrants. Caesaer then livcd and
At this juncture the judge who for some time had been sitting
Col. Josiah Stringer your time is up:
uneasily called out and said :-
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when and whereupon the Col. turning to the court said:I am not
half through. The judge remarked again-Your
time is up. Col.
Josiah Singer s a t down and after having run his fingers through his
long black hair he mopped his face.
His collar was wilted by perspiration from his physical eloquence
and he took a pose of supreme satisfaction while the judge charged
the jury. They retired and after time to write the verdict they
came into court with a verdict of guilty. At once the Judge told
Sam Hill t o stand up. Col. Josiah Singer stood up also and addressing the court said he hoped the court would be light on the defenda n t ; that he had been convicted of stealing two pullets and an ancient
'ooster and besides, said Col. Josiah Singer, he is a poor man. He
paid me one hundred dollars in cash for defending him a s this was
all he had. I would have charged him more if he had it. You know
your Honor under my oath of office I cannot refuse a case of the
poor f o r any consideration personal t o myself.
The judge promptly sentenced Sam t o twelve months in the chain
gang. When this fact became a mental concept with Sam he turned
to Col. Josiah Singer and blurted out: "God e r mighty Kernel you
said you would put me on de ground." Col. Josiah became heated
his face blushed and he replied: You rascal you do not appreciate
what I have done for you. I have by my professional ability put you
on the ground; you have the privilege of digging and shoveling dirt
on the roads for the next twelve months. If i t had not been for me
you would have been hanged.
One embryo pettifogger congratu!ated Col. Josiah Singer on his
speech as being wonderful. Col. Josiah Singer said himself that i t
was a great speech but he did not see how in the world t h a t jury ever
r a n over i t and found the defendant guilty. He seemed mortified a t
the disrespect shown him in not taking longer time to consider the
verdict.
It may be urged that such a trial is exceptional and t h a t such an
exhibition does not often happen. This is conceded but there are
parts of i t t h a t appear in many cases. Note t h e cross-examination
which was in disregard of all rules and without any object or purpose;
i t s only effect was to make sure the case of the prosecution. He
ignored the evidence; he vituperated the witness without any reason:
his assurance and self-exploitation availed nothing; the chances a r e
that he will stay in his r u t and' learn nothing from experience. The
lawyer must be practical; he must practise law inside of the law and
i t s rules. If Col. Josiah had been practical he would have filed a
plea of guilty for his client and bade him good bye for the chain gang.
'

M. Boucher, a French writer, wrote:-

"A Lawyer ought to present himself with an honest assurance
and plead with firmness, but with modesty in his language and demeanor. He should avoid affectation or fetching things too f a r
and should not wander from his subject. It he demands a favorable
hearing, let him do i t with dignity and not in any rampant tone. He
ought neither to exhaust himself too much or humble himself too
much, and the less he can manage to talk about himself the better."
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The Development of Trial by Jury
A distinguished bacteriologist when asked f o r a brief account of
the first appearance of harmful germs in the human system, remarked
simply : "Adam had 'em."
Unfortunately the origin of the jury cannot so briefly be told.
Nor, popular opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, i s this mode
of trial of great antiquity. I t is true that all of the civilized races
of the earth have a t certain stages of their development evolved a
method of deciding controversies somewhat related to it. I refer to
those ancient tribunals which were composed of all the free men of a
community--or certain selected freemen-such as the body t h a t tried
and condemned Socrates, or the old popular courts of the Teutons and
Scandanavians. But they were not juries, they were courts.
"If we a r e seeking f o r a court," say Pollock and Maitland in their
work on Early English Law, "In which a t the bidding of its president, or some national or royal officer, earldorman or reeve, the
inhabitants of a district, o r some group . . . . deemed the dooms,
shall pronounce judgment, we shall have no difficulty in discovering
the origin of trial by jury. Everywhere we might find such courts,
for during the earlier middle ages i t is the exception rather than
the rule t h a t the judgment be made by the lord o r president of the
court, or by a group of professional justices. But what the jurors
or recognitors of our Twelfth Century deliver is no judgment; they
come to recognize, to disclose the t r u t h ; their duty is not iudicin
facere, but recognoscere veritam." And they reach the conclusion,
now generally accepted by antiquaries, that the system was derived
from the Norman inquest.
It must be borne in mind t h a t the jury a s established in England
and a s still maintained there and in the British commonwealths, i s
not a court, but simply an adjunct of a court. I t is a group of layment unskilled in the !aw and sworn to declare, not what is just, not
what is equitable, but simply what is the truth-the t r u e facts in the
case. They have nothing to do with the effect of their findings.
They a r e not concerned with the judgment to be pronounced. They
are merely the means whereby the judges a r e furnished the facts
upon which t o predicate the judgments.
I emphasize this simple historic province of the jury because
many Americans assume that the numerous functions now performed
by juries in this country (such, f o r example, 2s determining punishment in felony cases and rendering general verdicts in intricate
equity causes) have either always been exercised by juries or constitute merely the restoration of pristine prerogatives. Confusion may
be avoided by keeping in mind t h a t the American tendency to make
of the jury something in the nature of the grimitive community
tribunal is entirely unwarranted by English precedent.
When trial by jury was established in England i t was under
Norman rule, the old "popular" courts had long been discarded and
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the prevailing mode of trial was by compurgation, ordeal, combat and
decree of the king's justiciars.
The conquerors had brought with them to England an institution
known a s the inquest or recognition which was employed first by
William in compiling Doomsdng Book. Its procednre mas to call together the leading men of a community who Itnew the facts and have
them to answer under oath such questions as might be asked t h e n
concerning the ownership or value of lands for taxes, or other matters in which the ruler had an bterest. It had long been used by the
Frankish kings in Gaul to settle controversies over royal properties,
and was in vogue when Normandy was first invaded. When we first
find record of i t in France i t seems to have been conducted in a n informal way between the king's representatives and the people of the
community. Later, only the most prominent and upright men of the
district were summoned. They were witnesses a s well a s jurors and
no man who professed ignorance of the matter was allowed to serve.
The number, naturally, was of wide variation. There are records of
. 66, 53, 41, 20, 17, 7, etc., having been employed. Presumably all
the "good men" who knew the facts were used.
Historians are not agreed as to the origin of the inquest nor from
whom the Franks acquired it. Some maintain that it was brought
from Asia by returning crusaders; others that it came to France
from Germany where i t had been borrowed by the Angles and Saxons
from their Slavonic neighbors in Northern Europe; still others declare i t was of Scandanavian origin. Stubbs in his Const?:tutiomL
History of England, says, "it may have been adopted (by the Franks)
from the fiscal regulations of the Theodosian Code and thus own some
distant relationship with Roman jurisprudence."
At any rate we can say ~yi_thhistoric certitude that i t was used
by the Frankish kings in the ninth century. "We see it," say Pollock
and Maitland, "in the Neustria which the Normans are invading.
Then the darkness settles down. When i t lifts we see in the new
states that have formed themselves no central power capable of wielding the old prerogatives. For a long time to come the sworn inquest
of neighbors will not be an utterly unknown thing in France, i t will
only be overwhelmed by the spread of the romno-canonical procedure; even in Germany it will appear from bime to time; yet on the
whole we may say that but for the conquest of England i t would have
perished and long ago become a matter for the antiquary."
The prevailing opinion is that it was unknown to Anglo-Saxon
England although there is a law of Ethelred the Unready, of about
the year 997, which cannot be entirely rejected as evidence of its
use in Danish England before the Conqueror arrived. It must be
remembered however, that this law refers to the accusing jury, not
to the trial jury. It provides that a moot must be held in every
Wapentake, and the twelve eldest thanes are to KO out with the reeve
and to swear upon the relic which he puts into their hands that they
will accuse no innocent and conceal no guilty man. I t is argued by
some scholars that a form of accusing inquest which was used by
Frankish churchmen to collect charges of sin as their royal contemporaries used i t t o collect charges of crime, may have been borrowed by
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English churchmen, and the plan in t u r n again appropriated, in England, by the temporal power. But of this no direct evidence has been
found. Certainly it cannot be said that the Danes o r other Scandanavian peoples did not themselves evolve a system very similar to the
inquest, although on this too the evidence is lacking, due largely to
the comparatively modern date of their books. But however that
may be, and whether o r not the Danes brought such a system to England there is no indication that the inquest was used anywhere in
England as a mode of trial, nor indeed that i t was used a s a n accusing jury outside of Danish territory, or, in short, that i t became a n
English institution until William the Conqueror brought i t with him
as his ducal prerogative. I t has been suggested that the readiness
with which the English fell into its use in the compiling of Doomsday
Book is an evidence of their familiarity with it. And there are certain Scandanavian scholars who still maintain that jury trials were
had in England long before the Conqueror arrived. Most Englishmen, however, a r e agreed that what was used in early England was
the community court in which the doomsmen not only determined
guilt but pronounced the judgment.
Aside from employing the inquest in fiscal matters, the indications are that very little use was made of it during the first century
of Norman rule. There has been preserved, however, a record of a
trial in which the Conquerer directed his jz~sticiars to summon the
moots of several shires to one place there to hear a plea between the
Abbot of Ely and divers other persons, and certain men of the neighborhood were required to declare upon oath what lands were held by
the church of Ely on the day of the Confessor's death. But such instances were few and in each case the parties were merely permitted
(for a substantial fee to the crown) to exercise this royal privilege.
I t was not until well into the reign of Henry I1 towards the end of
the twelfth century that litigants were given the right to demand a
trial by inquest, and then only in actions for land.
And these ordinances of the second Henry, usually referred to as
the Assizes of Clarendon, undoubtedly mark the beginning of the English jury system. First there was granted in 1166, the action known
as the assize of novc:l disseisin, over which Bracton tells us were spent
many wakeful nights. It provided that if any person be dispossessed
of his free tenement unjustly and without judgment he is to have the
right tc, demand a trial by inquest. At about this time there was
also instituted the Grand Assize and the petty assizes. These assizes
were merely the prescribing of definite rules of procedure for empanelling inquests, or (as they were later called) juries. As we have
seen, in the early days the number of recognitors-or jurors-was
not certain. Now i t was rather definitely fixed a t twelve, although
for several centuries afterwards we know that variations from this
number were permitted.
The manner of assembling the Grand As.sixe is thus described in
an early report: "Four knights were called who came to the bar
girt with swords and were charged to choose twelve knights g i r t with
swords from themselves and others," and these armed knights thus
selected from among those who were assumed to know the facts, were
sworn to answer truly the questions propounded to them. If the
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twelve could not agree this fact was made known to the court and
new knights were added until there were secured twelve who could
agree. In the p e t t y assizes twelve jurors were selected by the sheriff,
who were not required to be knights. I n certain of the important
actions the right was given litigants to be tried by the Grand Assize,
in others the p e t t y assizes were used.
At this time the knowledge upon which jurors acted was their
own, and long after the practice was established in later years of
permitting witnesses to testify before the jury they had the right to
disregard such testimony entirely and rely upon their own knowledge
of the facts. But modern investigators also believe t h a t even from
the first the recognitors were not restricted to their own personal
knowledge. I t was not necessary t h a t they be eye-witnesses; when
they were summoned they were told of the nature of the controversy
and were expected to fully inform themselves concerning it.
As the number of jurors were at first not invariably fixed a t
twelve, so too was the rule requiring unanimity unknown. Brunner
says that only in the second half of the fourteenth century did this
principle become established. (And even today in England the parties may and frequently do agree to a majority verdict in civil cases.)
But after the rule became fixed the judges used the harshest measures t o bring about an agreement. In 1334 i t is recorded t h a t "because one jury man had delayed his companions a day and a night
without agreeing with them, and this without reason, it was awarded
that he stay in the Fleet."
Jurors were not allowed food or drink, water excepted, nor heat
while they deliberated. And if they continued deadlocked to the end
of the term of court, they were carted, in the wake of the judges, to
the edge of the county and there dumped into a ditch.
Why the number twelve was hit upon is thus explained by a
writer in 1665:
"This number is no less esteemed by our law than by Holy Writ. If the
twelve apostles on their twelve thrones must try us in our eternal state, good
reason hath the law to appoint the number of twelve to try our temporal.
The tribes of Israel were twelve, and Solomon's officers were twelve. Therefore not only matters of fact mere tried by twelve, but of ancient times twelve
judges were to try matters in law in the Exechequer Chamber, and there wers
twelve counsellors of state for matters of state; and he that wageth his law
must have eleven others with hlm who believe he says true. And the law
is so precise in the number of twelve that if the trial be by more or less, it is
a mistrial."

From the beginning with novel disseisin the number of causes
that the parties were permitted to t r y by inquest rapidly increased
until before the end of the next century we find (in the three years
1256, 1269 and 1279) that out of a list of 103 civil cases all but two
were disposed of by this method, and when the ordeal was abolished
in 1219, the inquest was used in criminal cases.
When, however, we recall the modes of trial the inquest supplanted, i t is easy to believe the remark of Bracton t h a t the decision to
grant i t occasioned many wakeful nights, and ( i t may be added)
sleepless knights. Probably a typical indication of how the new mode
of trial was received is given by a writer of the 13th century who
complains in the Mimow t h a t i t is a n abuse that one should not be
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allowed to try his case by battle or ordeal but must submit t o what a
set of strangers might say, mere witnesses selected by a public officer. .It will be recalled that a t that time the belief was almost
universal that justice was divine, and that the ordeal and battle
were but human agencies through which the will of God might be
made manifest.
Of course no criminal caught red-handed was given a trial of
any sort. When a felony was committed the law required that there
be raised a t once the hue and cry. If one chanced upon a dead body,
for instance, and failed to raise the hue, besides putting himself
under the gravest suspicion he was liable to be amerced. The proper
thing for him t o do was to cry "Out, out," whereupon all within hearing were required to turn out with their bows, arrows and knives,
and with much clamor and blowing of horns the hue was carried
from vill to vill. If the culprit was taken and had still about him
signs of the crime he was given short shrift,. If he resisted he was
slain. If he submitted to capture his doom was already sealed. He
was immediately taken to court and without being permitted to say
a word for himself was promptly beheaded or thrown over a cliff,
the person aggrieved most probaby acting as executioner. Nor were
such summary methods confined to crimes of violence or theft. If a
litigant in a civil suit produced a forged writ he was as promptly
hanged unless he could name a warrantor.
But it was one thing to dispatch a culprit known to be guilty or
shown to be so by unmistakable signs from Heaven, while quite another to dispose of him merely upon the verdict of human beings.
Anc! the judges found much difficulty, after the abolition of the ordeal, in adjusting the new mode of trial to criminal cases. In the
Leges Henrici the author flatly declares, "No one is t o be convicted
of a capital crime by testimony." I n 1219 when the first eyre of
Henry I11 was in progress instructions were sent to the judges from
the Kings Council to the effect that persons charged with the gravest
crimes were to be kept in prison for safe custody, but the imprisonment must not endanger life or health. If the crimes were less
serious and the accused under the old law would have gone to the
ordeal they might be allowed to abjure the realm. If the crimes
were light they might give pledges to keep the peace. Nothing is
said about compelling any of them to submit to a trial by inquest.
Somethins was required to meet the situation and the .judges finally
hit upon this way out of the difficulty: while they believed that no
man should be tried by jury without his consent they had no scruples
in forcing that consent, and the felons were subjected to the severest
hardships. They were "ironed," they were forced to lie on the
ground in the foulest spots in the prison and allowed only a little
bread one day and a little water the next. And soon the horrible
practice of peine f o r t e e t dure was developed, which consisted in plac-.
ing upon a prisoner more iron than he could bear.
Thus was consent obtained and trial by jury incorporated into
the body of English criminal law.
. The change from the old inquest of recognitors in full possession of the facts to a jury without knowledge of the matter was very
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gradual; a t first only witnesses to deeds were allowed to appear o
attest the authenticity of these documents, but with the increased
use of the system, witnesses were relied upon more and more. In
the reign of Henry IV we find the judges declaring that the jurors
after they have been sworn must not be permitted to see or take with
them into the jury room any evidence other than that offered in the
coui-t, although the personal knowledge of the jury was not then
considered as outside of the evidence, and stress was still laid upon
securing jurors only from the neighborhood. At length, however,
we find the judges ruling that if a man has any knowledge of the
cause, especially if he has formed a decided opinion, he cannot qualify as a juror.
Space will not permit any lengthy discussion of the grand jury.
It has already been remarked that in the time of Ethelred the Unready
in that part of England which had been conquered by the Danes, such
a system was used. But there is no record of its having been used
elsewhere in England prior to 1166 when Henry the second issued his
famous assizes of Clarendon. I t is therefore not too much to say
that the Grand Assize, which was employed as an accusing jury as
well as a trial jury, was the beginning of the grand jury system in
England.
In course of time it came to be recognized that the accusing jury
should not serve as a trial jury, and the two were made separate
and distinct, and from the more or less perfunctory agency of helping men to the gallows in the early days we find that trial jurors
during the 14th century had developed such leniency that many of
the judges felt constrained to use coercive means to induce them to
convict. But that phase too, passed, and i t was recognized that
jurors should not be coerced in any way.
I cannot, for want of space, detail the further development in
England of this system which has been so woven into the web and
woof of the English constitution a s to be not the least of its distinguishing characteristics. Suffice i t to say that except for having been
made liable to punishment for making unwarranted verdicts and later
having such liability removed, the modern jury there is almost identical with those last described. In civil causes only such questions of
disputed fact are submitted to the jury as the judge certifies to be
material. Many causes are disposed of without the aid of juries.
Nor will space permit more than a brief reference to some of the
pronounced American modifications of the system, which were largely
wrought during the past hundred years.
Many of the States have declared by statute that in criminal
trials the jury are the judges of both the law and the facts, although
jurors are not allowed to carry law books with them into the jury
room; and in some of the States jurors are required to fix the punishment of felons whose criminal record they are not permitted to
learn. Judges have been forbidden in most of the States to express
or intimate any opinion a s to the weight of the evidence o r the credibility of witnesses. The practice of rendering general verdicts in
civil causes of every nature, which enables the jury to apply their own
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construction of the law of the case, prevails in practically all of the
State courts in the Union.
I t is difficult to say whether or not this trend in America towards vesting in the jury the powers and duties of the old tribal courts
has reached its limit. Chief Justice Taft and many other distinguished jurists advocate confining the province of the jury to its original
function of finding the facts. This view, added to a growing feeling
that all is not well with the machinery of administering justice in
America, coupled with the frequent comparisons (to our disadvantage) of courts in this country with those of England, may bring about
a reaction. But that of course concerns the future, which is beyond
the scope of this article.
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Appellate Court Briefs and Arguments
Address Delivered before the Georgia Bar Association. 1927.
There has been great change in the method of presenting cases
to appellate courts since the organization of the Supreme Court of this
State. No time limit of argument was fixed by the original rules
of that court; reading of authorities to the court, which now is discouraged, was formerly required; and i t was provided that "no
cause shall be urged by brief alone." In a decision rendered in 1852
(Thornton v. Lane, 11 Ga. 489) Judge Lumpkin said: "We have
listened patiently a t least, if not with unmixed pleasure, to eight elaborate arguments, occupying more than as many days." He added
that these arguments (which were by the most eminent lawyers in
the State) were "on questions some of which have never been disputed, and most of them heretofore solemnly adjudicated in this
court." After a case in the United States Supreme Court had been
argued for eight days, Judge Story wrote that probably it would occupy five more; one lawyer spoke three days. We are told that Chief
Justice Marshall "encouraged extended arguments, often demanded
them." (Beveridge's Marshall, vol. 4, p. 96.) What was said by
Judge Lumpkin in the fifty-page opinion mentioned, a s to long arguments, may in part explain why he said, in a year in which only 138
cases were decided by his court, that there was imposed on that
court "an amount of labor
. without a parallel in any other
appellate tribunal in the world."
Eventually brevity in argument became necessary, to enable the
court to decide all the cases in the time prescribed by the constitution; and the entire time for argument on one side was limited, first
to two hours, and later to one hour. A half hour is the limit in the
Court of Appeals in civil cases involving not more than $1000 and
misdemeanor cases. In some States a half-hour rule applies to all
cases; but (as in this State) more time may be granted on request
made before argument.
In a large proportion of the cases in the appellate courts of this
State there is no oral argument. Lawyers often remark that it ia
not worth while to make such an argument; that the briefs suffice;
but a fact that they may overlook is that an oral argument reaches
judges who without it would know nothing of the case except from
the statement of the judge who writes the decision; for it is not
practicable for all the judges to read the record and the briefs in all
the cases in which they join in the decision. The value of an oral
argument depends much on the time that passes before the judges
consider the case, but even when there has been long delay before
consideration, a judge is likely to recall a t least the impression made
on his mind a t the time of argument; and if that impression does not
accord with the view of the judge who has prepared an opinion for
the court, it may cause further consideration of the case. In many
cases a conclusion as to how the case should be decided is reached by
judges a t the time of the oral argument. If counsel on one side
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argues the case orally, it is to the interest of his adversary to have
an opportunity to reply and to make corrections. A great jurist
(Judge Dillon) said: "As a means of enabling the court to underthere is no substitute for oral argument."
stand the exact case,
But an oral argument is of little or no value if it is not clear or
does not leave a distinct impression on the minds of the judges. If
a lawyer thinks i t worth while to go to the appellate court for argument, he should consider it worth while to give careful thought to
what he shall say. Men often travel a long distance and waste time
and expense to make an argument from which the hearer learns little
of the case, or of which, to repeat a common remark, it is impossible
to make head or tail. Many waste time in details which the judges,
with minds crowded with other cases, can not be expected to remember, or in discussing the weight or credibility of testimony which,
when the jury and the trial judge have accepted it a s true, the appellate court must treat as true.
Much that may properly be included in a written argument
should be omitted from oral argument. Reading a t length to the
court from the record or from anything else is discouraged. "The
true function" of oral argument, said the head of a court which had
adopted the half-hour limit, is that of "briefly introducing the case
to the court and affording the judges who are to decide it an opportunity to make inquiry of counsel, and the latter to enlighten the
court, on points that may suggest themselves in course of presentation." Most cases, however, can be thoroughly argued in the time
allowed by the rules in this State.
There is no rule in this State as to what a brief shall contain.
Formerly a rule of the Supreme Court required that briefs "be confined to a statement of the points insisted upon, and a citation of
authorities;" and i t was added that "if counsel desire to furnish a
written summary or narrative of the facts, or to make a written argument, this must be done in a separate document, and not by expanding or overloading the brief." A good practice is to include
these features under one cover, beginning with the short brief, and
following it with a development of the case and presenting the argument in the order in which the points are stated in the preliminary
brief. Points omitted will not be considered.
The rule of the United States Supreme Court as to briefs is long
and need not be stated here; its first requirement is that the brief
shall contain "a concise abstract, or statement of the case, presenting
succinctly the questions involved and the manner in which they are
raised." A simple and helpful requirement is that the brief shall
refer to pages of the record. An index in front is useful when a
brief is long. Grounds of a motion for a new trial are often dealt
with in a decision in the order in which they appear in the motion;
and this method is used in most briefs. This is convenient, but is
not always the best method. Grounds which can be discussed together may be grouped i n ' t h e brief. Short headings indicating tho
matter of the grounds, or of other points discussed, are helpful.
Good examples of briefs are to be found in the United States Supreme
Court Reports and in the earliest reports of our State Supreme Court.

. .
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In this State the reporter now is not allowed to give more of the
briefs than their points and citations.
Often from one page to three or four pages suffice for brief and
argument; and where no greater space is used the method of arrangement is not important. If the record is short, nothing is gained by
repeating much of it in the brief. If there is much amendment of
pleadings, the court may be aided by showing briefly the effect of
the amendments. The brief may aid the court in elimination. The
elimination should extend to trivial and hopeless exceptions.
Cases differ so widely that there is no system suited to all briefs.
They may well vary in arrangement, just as judicial opinions do.
System is useful only as a means to an end. When you have in
hand the material for your brief, the first question to consider is,
how can you most quickly and clearly put your case into the mindn
of the judges.
I offer a few short practical suggestions in the form of a dozen
points or paragraphe :
Brevity is the first rule of briefing; clearness the cardinal
virtue of a brief.
Begin by mentally putting yourself in the place of the
judge; try to find the shortest road to the mind uninformed
as to your case.
A judge wishes to know first the question he is to decide.
Give it; show how i t arose.
Give as briefly a s possible the facts the judge needs to
know. Do not require him to charge his mind with useless
things to get a t your case. If there is no good reason for giving names, places, dates, figures, or other details, omit them.
Ficts usually should be stated in order of time, or grouped
to support points. Often they may be stated in such a way
as in effect to argue the case.
Come promptly to the strongest points, just as you would
in trying to sell to a busy man. Attention to an oral argument usually is best a t the beginning; weak points may
weaken it. Don't waste time on "pointees."
Citations not in point are worse than useless; they cause
waste of the court's time, and may cause distrust of your
judgment or of your fairness. Examine each case cited.
Long quotations are to be avoided; short ones are often a
good way of both stating a point and supporting it.
Assume that the judges know the A-B-Cs of the law, and
that argument is not needed to convince them on wellsettled points.
Avoid jury arguments to a court that can not consider
them.
Personalities forbidden by the rules get you nowhere but
in contempt of court.
"Honesty is the best policy;" i t ia a great mistake to lone
the confidence of the court by unfairness or misleading
statements. Don't go outside the record.
Important is the statement of a former Justice of the Supreme
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Court of the United States, Judge Clarke, in addressing the New
York Bar Association, that "there can be no doubt whatever that
many a meritorius case has been lost in an over expanded statement
of evidence or in the wilderness of inappropriate citations in which
it has been submerged beyond the hope of resurrection in a treatise
styled a brief." If briefs were responsible for wrong decisions by
the great court of which Judge Clarke was a member, what are we
to expect from courts in general when similar briefs are presented to
them? And how important i t is to know what to omit from a brief.
Frequently, in the Supreme Court of the United States, judges
interrupt argument by saying, "State your question." A rule of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that briefs shall begin with a statement of the questions involved, says, that the rule "is designed to
enable the court to obtain an immediate view of the controversy. I t
must state the question or questions in the briefest and most general
terms, without names, dates, amounts, or particulars of any kind
whatsoever. I t should not ordinarily exceed fifteen lines, and must
not under any circumstances exceed a page." Nothing else is allowed
on that page. "For any violation of this rule . . . . the appeal
(will be) non-prossed. This rule is to be regarded a s in the highest
degree mandatory and admitting of no exception." The penalty
stated, the court has said, may be inflicted "even in murder cases."
This rule and a half-hour limit for argument on each side "materially aided one of our busiest appellate tribunals in bringing its
work up to date," said Chief Justice von Moschzisker. He added:
"When the rule is efficiently followed, as i t is in the great majority
of cases, the court can, a t a glance, perceive, a t least in a general
way, the points for determination, and, with this accomplished, tho
judicial mind can better concentrate on the argument." "Often appellant's statement is so satisfactory that the court, in writing its
opinion, takes up the questions involved just as they are stated and
follows that order throughout." (34 Yale Law Journal, 287.) Incidentally i t may be said that sometimes briefs have been adopted by
judges as opinions. Sometimes a judge's way of making a case clear
in an opinion is a good model for a brief.
Much space in briefs can be saved by omitting what may be implied. For example, your case would not be on the docket if certairi
preliminary steps had not been taken; why detail them a t length? If
a brief insists on a ground of a motion for a new trial, the court
need not be told first that such a motion was filed, "and duly came
on to be heard," that "the court, after hearing the same, passed an
order overruling said motion," and that "movant thereupon filed in
due time his bill of exceptions to this court, assigning error on said
judgment," etc. You can leave some things to the record.
Verbosity tempts to skimming. Nothing is gained by using
long and stilted forms of expression instead of the simple language.
of ordinary speech and of the best writers. Why, for instance, should
the ten words, "prior to the time of the filing of the action," be
preferred to the two words, "before suit?"
I t is not my purpose to depart so f a r from more practical matters as to dwell upon niceties of expression. Though, as was said by
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Judge Bleckley, "in school the composition would not pass,
. it
may be tolerated in the co-urt-house." That great lawyer, Sir Frederick Pollock, chief editor of the English law reports, however, in an
address to the American Bar Association (1903), thought i t worth
while to condemn, a s a "pest of the law reports," so small a thing
a s what he termed "the slovenly misuse of 'such' a s a demonstrative,"
a use peculiar to lawyers.
Reading is not made easier by saids, sames, and certain other
legal-document words. Writers of law-books and of judicial opinions
make their meaning clear without a superfluity of such expressions,
and the framers of the Federal constitution avoided them.
Form, of course, is secondary to substance, but i t is important
so f a r as i t is an aid to substance; and great judges have taken great
pains to be not only correct, but clear and concise, in their opinions.
Judge Bleckley, who could be luminous, said: "I reconsider, revise,
scrutinize, revise the scrutiny, and scrutinize the revision."
I do not go so f a r a s one writer does who lays down the rule,
"Never dictate a brief;" but as to dictated briefs I suggest, as a
general rule, revise; or brief the brief.
Don't annoy the court with excessive noise. Habits formed in
addressing juries cling to many lawyers in the appellate courts, and
some not only use jury arguments, but shout their cases a t the court.
I t may be that such seeming earnestness accounts for the statement
that "it was earnestly contended," found in judicial opinions, but
this statement is made only where the argument failed to convince.
I have dealt only with the manner of presenting a case. Before
briefing, of course, there should be thorough knowledge of the facts
of the case and careful search and examination of the law and decisions that may be applicable.
After so much has been said about brevity, I must not myself
ignore, further than I have already done, the advice given on that
subject.
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Liens and Assignments of Bankrupt
ExemptionProperty Under Georgia
Practice and Decisions
The right to sell or otherwise dispose of property claimed by a
bankrupt a s exemption is settled in Georgia by a number of direct
rulings on the point. ( 1 )
I t is equally a s well settled that a note containing a clause that
assigned the exemption property to the holder of a note and directed
the trustee to deliver over to the holder a sufficient amount of property or money claimed a s exempt to pay the note, although executed
prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, had the legal effect
of a valid assignment of the bankrupt's exemption after i t was set
apart to him and being older than an exemption assignment made by
him after his adjudication, was entitled to priority of payment over
the junior one. (2)
The principle ruled in cases in which i t was held that an insolvent
debtor in Georgia could prefer one creditor over another by a bona
fide transfer of property, under provisions of Code section 3230, a8
was held in Fletcher case, supra and earlier cases cited therein, was
relied upon by practioners in bankruptcy matters, when the debtor
desired to favor a local bank or other creditor to whom he would
assign his exemption usually while in contemplation of filing or
shortly after he filed his bankruptcy petition or an involuntary petition was filed against him.
The effect of the holding that notes containing a clause of assignment of the exemption given by a person when he was not contemplating bankruptcy, would operate a s a valid assignment of exemption should the maker by thereafter adjudged a bankrupt, giving
to the oldest dated note containing such an assignment clause priority of payment because senior in point of date, according to the
equitable maxim qui prior in tempore potior est jure, was to give
to the holder of such an assignment clause a preference that the
debtor would not have given had he "contemplated bankruptcy"
when he signed the note.
Two efforts to give preferences to creditors by the creation of a
mortgage lien in one case and by a deed of conveyance in the other,
were held to be fruitless since both transfers were junior in date to
the notes containing assignment clauses held by contesting creditors. ( 3 )
If the debtor desires to prefer a creditor under Code section
3230, probably he might be able to do so notwithstanding the fact
1 Felker vs. Crane 70 Ga. 484. Strickland vs. Fletcher 152

I

Ga. 445.
Saul vs. Bowers, 1,55 GIL. 450, Comer Bank vs. Meador-Cauthorn Co. 160
,Ga.717.
3 Comer Bank Case. supra and Bank of ponialdsonville case, 169 Ga. 846.
2
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that he may have given notes containing an assignment clause, if the
principle ruled in Coker vs. Utter, 152 Ga. 158 and McBride vs. Gibbs,
148 Ga. 380, should be applied to a transfer given in contemplation
of bankruptcy but recorded a s a mortgage lien securing a waiver
note prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
In the Coker case i t was held that judgments and other liens
given by an insolvent within four months of the filing of a bankruptw
petition were not avoided thereby if the lien was on exemption property since the trustee did not take title to it.
I n the McBride case, i t was held that liens on property existing
prior to bankruptcy followed the property into the court of bankruptcy and would attach to such part of the proceeds as were set
apart therein as a bankrupt's exemption.
Seemingly i t would follow that if a debtor owned a small farm.
having a market value of sixteen hundred dollars, and desired to
favor a local bank or other creditor by a transfer of his exemptioll
after his adjudication as a bankrupt, that he might prior to the filing
of his bankruptcy petition, give to such a creditor a mortgage to secure a waiver note, creating a lien on the property, which the creditor
would have recorded in county clerk's office prior to the filing of
the bankrupt's petition.
After his adjudication, the bankrupt would list in his schedule
the farm, as his exemption, and under the McBride case, supra, the
lien would follow the property into the court of bankruptcy and
would not be divested by the adjudication.
The holder of the notes containing as assignment of the exemption could only subject the right and title that the bankrupt would
have in the property a t the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, which on that date was subject to the mortgage lien. Apparently the contest would not be one of priority of date of the contesting
instruments but priority of vested rights.
The mortgage creditors lien vested in him before bankruptcy
while the holder of the assignment of exemption, held a contingent
right that only became a vested right when the maker of the note war3
adjudged a bankrupt and as such claimed the property as his exemption, but in so claiming it, did he not do so subject to existing valid
liens against i t and wo~lldi t not be set apart to him cum onere and if
so, the recorded mortgage lien would have a valid preference. The
trustee would not be affected by the mortgage lien under ruling in
Coker case, supra, as i t affects only exemption property.

.
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Marshall and Taney: A Parallel
(BY A W. COZART
OF THE COLUMBIJS,
GEORGIA,
BAR)
The correct official title of the judge who presides over the Supreme Court of the United States is Chief Justice of the United States
and not Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The most famous Chief Justices of that Court were John Marshall and Roger Brooke Taney.
They were both blessed by distinguished ancestry for generations back. Both of them were well educated. Marshall received
instruction under private tutors and some lectures in natural philosophy a t William and Mary, and a short course of law lectures under
Chancellor Wythe a t the same College. Taney was graduated from
Dickinson College in Pennsylvania, and studied law in the office of
Judge J. T. Chase.
Both loved the law and politics, and they were successful a t the
bar and in politics from the first. Marshall had one hundred and
fourteen cases before the Appellate Court of Virginia and won fifty
of them. Taney had a large and varied practice in the State and
Federal courts and he was the best equipped lawyer who ever became
Chief Justice of the United States. Marshall was a member of Virginia's General Assembly and Taney was a member of Maryland's
Legislature and was the Attorney-General of his State.
Both were members of Presidents Cabinets and the Presidents
were grateful and wise in making the appointments.
John Adams appointed Marshall Secretary of State in his Cabinet
and Andrew Jackson appointed Taney Attorney-General, then Secretary of the Treasury, then Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
and then Chief Justice. His appointments to the Secretaryship of
the Treasury and Associate-Justiceship were not confirmed by the
Senate.
Clay and Webster opposed these appointments in the Senate but
they soon recognized their error in so f a r a s the opposition related to
the Chief Justiceship and Clay graciously apologized to Taney.
When Marshall was Secretary of State, he was accused of being
the "tool" of Adams because he had signed the commissions of the
"mid-night" judges. When Taney was. Secretary of the Treasury he
was charged with being the "pliant instrument" of Jackson because
he signed the order preventing further deposits from being made ir.
the National Bank.
They were both happily married. Marshall lived with his wife
for more than fifty years and Taney lived with his wife for more
than forty-seven years.
Marshall was neither religious nor irreligious. He was non-religious. He was a member of the Episcopal Church. Taney was a
devout Roman Catholic.
Marshall was convivial. Taney was abstn,niious.
Marshall's style was clear and his reasoning was cogent, but he
was redundant and prolix. In four of his very greatest opinions ho
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cited not a single authority. Taney's style was as lucid a s i t was
precige and a s convincing a s i t was perspicuous.
Marshall died in his eightieth year after having been Chief Justice for thirty-four years. Taney died in his eighty-eighth year
after having been Chief Justice for twenty-eight years and after haring administered the oath of office to seven Presidents of the United
States.
FAMOUS OPINIONS.
( a ) The greatest condemnation visited upon Marshall a s well
a s upon Taney was the result of certain obiter dieta contained in two
of their most famous opinions.
In the opinion by Marshall in the case of Marbury v. Madison.
1 Chanch 137 (1803), he went out of the record entirely to hold that
An Act of Congress r e p u g a n t to the Constitution is void. Other
State Supreme Courts had previously held that !aws passed by legislatures in violation of the constitution of their States were void, but
Marshall did not cite any of these cases. I t might have been more
prudent, if not wiser, for Marshall to have decided the case simply
upon the jurisdictional question, and, in that event, he would not
have incurred the displeasure and censure of Jefferson and Jefferson's Party.
Taney's great blunder was in not disposing of the Dred Scott
case upon the jtirisdictional question and in not refraining from setting out in his opinion certain obiter dicta on the slavery question,
which obiter dicta brought about unexpected and most horrible political consequences. The decision did much to cause the War between
the States. Taney's judgment was not as sound touching this matter
a s his motives were pure.
(b) Marshall's opinion in the Dartmouth College case i g hfs
most famous opinion. This case has been called, "An Amendment to
the Constitution," but i t has been limited for the better by the
"poli~e-power" cases and i t has been modified and limited for the best
by Taney's very great and his first ovinion on a constitutional question in the Charles River B r i d ~ ecase, 11 Peters 420 (1837), tliough
Taney, in his opinion, did not even mention the Dartmouth College
case. Daniel Webster lost his first case before th3t Court involving
a constitution question, when he lost the Charles River Bridge case.
Taney ruled in this case that public rants should ho construed strictly and that nothing passed by im~lication.
I n this connection i t should be observed that the Dartmouth College case has been cited more times than anv other case that has
ever been decided by any American court. In the book entitled
"Webster Centennial a t Dartmouth Collepe," paxe 285, i t is said that
this case has been cited in the American Reports 970 times. This
book was published several years ago and this case has been cited
since t h a t time many times more.
(c) In 1842. Marshall, in what, I consider, his greatest opinion,
in the case of Gibbons v Onden, 9 Wheaton 1, held that Congress has
the power to regulate interstate commerce, and the judgment of the
New York Court of Errors mas reversed. The opinion in the case
when decided by the New York court was written by Kent and Kent's
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opinion upheld the law of the State of New York which conflicted
with the United States Constitution. The decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States put interstate commerce on a sound basis
and liberated the 200 navigable rivers of the United States.
Taney, in 1851, in the case of "The Genesee Chief," in a masterly
opinion, held that the United States Courts had exclusive admiralty
jurisdiction over all inland navigable waters. The opinion in thia
case compares favorably with the opinion of Marshall in the case of
Gibbons v Ogden. I t construed the admiralty clause of the Constitution. Marshall's opinion construed the interstate clause.
(d) In McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheaton 423, Tvlarshall, rendering the opinion, held that Congress had the implied power to create
the Bank of the United States and that Maryland had no power to tax
the Bank, as "the power to tax implied the power to destroy." This
was the first case to construe the "implied-powers" clause of the Federal Constitution. The arguments made in the case before the Supreme Court were, perhaps, the greatest ever made in any court.
Webster, Wirt and Pinkney argued for the Government and Martin,
Hopkins and Jones for Maryland.
(e) In Cohens v Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264 (1821), Marshall
wrote the opinion in which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over a State was established and a revisory appellate power of that
Court over the judgments of State courts was established, that is, in
cases where a Federal question is involved. This decision had great
nationalizing influence and consequences.
In the case of Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1858), Taney
wrote the opinion which was so clear and logical and his conclusions
so preeminently just and righteous that even his bitterest enemiev
have most heartily concurred in the opinion. He, himplelf, most
modestly said that the opinion was "satisfactory."
An effort was made by the United State2 Government to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Law and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin pronounced the Act of Congress void, and resisted the administration and
enforcement of the law by the Federal authorities. Taney's opinion
reversed the judrzmcnt of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In a letter which the writer received from Hon. Charles Warren
of Washinrtton, D. C., dated Dec. 9, 1925, he said: "My private opinion is thnt Taney's opinion in the Booth case was greater than that
in The Canesee Chief case, and that it did quite as much to preserve
the Union as anything which appeared in Marshall's opinions."
Warren is the highest authority on the history of the Supreme
Court of the United States. He won the $2000.00 Pulitzer Prize for
the best work in history a few years ago with his, "The Supreme
Court is United States History.''
The decision in Ableman v Booth had as great a nationalizing
effect as the opinion in Cohens v Virginia.
(f) In the case of Worcester v Georgia, 6 Peters 315, (1832),
Marshall rendered an opinion in which he decided against Georgia,
and President Andrew Jackson is reported to have said, "Marshall
has made the decision, now let him execute it."
Taney rendered a decision in the Merryman ease, 1 Campbell
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246, (1861). In this case the question involved was whether President Lincoln had illegally suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Taney
held that he had illegally suspended the writ and he sent Lincoln a
copy of the opinion, but Lincoln utterly ignored the decision and refused to inforce the judgment.
In these two cases both Presidents were wrong and both Chief
Justices were right.
THEIR WORK ON T H E BENCH COMPARED
While Marshall was presiding over the Supreme Court, 1106
cases were decided and he wrote the opinions in 519 of them. I n 62
of those cases constitutional questions were involved and he wrote
the opinions in 36 of them.
During Taney's incumbency the Court rendered a f a r greater
number of decisions, but it was Taney's courteous policy to permit
the Associate Justices to share the honor with him in the preparation
and delivery of the opinions of the Court in important cases.
Marshall believed in a liberal construction of the Constitution
and he was very loose, careless, and informal when i t came to questions of practice and procedure in the Supreme Court.
Taney was a strict constructionist and he insisted upon the court
being conducted in an orderly manner and he did more t o establish
rules of practice and procedure than any other judge who has been
a member of that Court.
PERSONAL APPEARANCE
I n personal appearance both were ugly to hideouity. Marshall
did not have but one good f e a t u r e h i s brilliant black eyes. Taney
did not have but one good feature-his
well-shaped forehead.
I shall conclude this parallel by quoting two remarkable pen-pictures and two exquisite tributes paid by them to their wives:
"IIarshall, when appointed chief justice, was 46 years old, and William Wirt
thus describes him:
"The chief justice of United States is in his person tall, meagre, emaciated;
his muscles a r e so relaxed as not only to disqualify him apparently for any
vigorous exertion of the body, but to destroy everything like harmony in his
whole appearance and demeanor, dress, attitude, gesture; sitting, standing or
walking. he is as f a r removed from idolized graces of Lord Chesterfield a s any
other gentleman on earth. His head and face are small in proportion to his
height; his complexion swarthy; the muscles i f his face being relaxed, make
him appear to be fifty years of age-nor can he be much younger. His countenance h a s a faithful expression of good humor and hilarity, while his black
eyes, that unerring index, possesses a n irradiating spirit, which proclaims t h e
imperial powers of the mind that sits enthroned within."'
"John H. B. Lathrobe described Taney, when Taney was attorney general
in 1913, thus:
"When Mr. Taney rose to speak, you saw a tall, square-shouldered man,
flat breasted in a degree to be remarked upon, with a stoop t h a t made his
shoulders even more prominent, a face without one good feature, a mouth unusually large, in which were discolored and irregular teeth, the gums of which
were visible when he smiled, dressed always in black. his clothes sitting ill
upon him, his hand spare with projecting veins-in a ward, a gaunt, ungainly
man."
Tributes to
Wives
On December 25, 1832, Marshall wrote:
"On the 3rd of January, 1873, I was united by the holiest ;bonds to the
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woman I adored. From the moment of our union to that of our separation, I
never ceased to thank Heaven for this, its best gift. Not a moment passed
i n which I did not consider her as ablessing from which the chief happiness of
my life was derived. This never-dying sentiment, originating in love, was cherished #by long and close observation of as amiable and estimable qualities a s
ever adorned the female bosom."
Taney wrote his wife, on January 7, 1862:
"I cannot, my dearest wife, suppose the 7th day of January to pass without renewing to you the pledges of love which I made to you on the 7th of
January, fortyaix years ago, and, although I a m sensi'ble that in that long
per:od I have done many things which I ought not to have done, and have left
undone many things which I ought t o have done, yet in constant affection to
you I have never wavered, never being insensible how much I owe you, and
now pledge t o you again a love as true and sincere as tha.t I offered on the 7th
of January, 1806."
Note: Taney married Miss Key, a Protestant, the slster of Francis Scott
Key, t h e author of the "Star Spangled Banner." She died of yellow fever in
1855 a t Old Point Comfort. Taney died October 12, 1864.
)Marshall married Miss Amber, of Williamsburg. She died December 25,
1831.
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Notes
"Money reserved as interest a t highest lawful rate a t time of
making loan is usury."
It is a common custom among some financing institutions to
loan money and a t the time of making the loan to take out the interest. This has been held by our courts to be usury. For instance
where a person borrows $100.00 and stipulates in the contract payment of interest a t 8 per cent for a period of three months, and the
bank reserves a t the time of making the loan $2.00 interest and delivers to the borrower $98.00. The object of interest is compensation
for the use of money. The borrower does not receive all of the principal stated in his obligation, because of the reservation of enough to
pay the interest. The real principal of his obligation is the amount
which he actually receives, namely $98.00. When he pays the principal a s stated in his obligation, from which the maximum rate of interest was deducted in advance he pays a sum in excess of that which
he received and interest on it.
The legal rate of interest in this State is 7% per annum but the
parties may stipulate in writing for a higher rate, not to exceed 8%
per annum. Our Statute defines usury a s 'reserving and taking or
contracting to reserve and take either directly or by indirection tc
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greater stim for the use of mafief than the lawful interest ( I ) . The
Code further declares-'It
shall not be Iawful for any person, company, or corporation to reserve, charge or take for any loan o r advance
of money, or forbearance to enforce the collection of any sum of money, any rate of interest greater than 8% per annum, either directly
or indirectly by way of commissions for advances, discount, exchange,
or by any contract or contrivance or device whatever! (2) All laws
respecting the rate of interest charged for the loan of money by individuals are applicable to banks. (3)
It apparently was held to be the rule in cases of short time loana
not to be usurious where interest was taken out in advance, by a
number of authorities. Namely: McKenzie v. FIannery, 90 Ga. 691
(5) ; Union Savings Bahk v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606; McCall v.
Herring, 116 Ga. 236. But the Supreme Court held in Patton v.
Bank of LaFayette, 124 Ga. 695 that these decisions were obiter
dictum, and later in the case of Lbgansville Banking Co. v. Forrester,
143 Ga. 303 the rule was laid do? that i t was usury. If we follow
the words of the statute there can be no legitimate differentation of
short term from long term loans. And in the latter cane i t had
never been doubted that it was usury to reserve in advance interest
for loans in the excess of the highest legal rate for a period extending over a year.
The outside authorities are almost dnanimous however, that in
short term loans it is not usurious to reserve the interest in advance.
This rule of decision is followed by the United States courts in the
case of Evans v. National Bank of Savannah, 250 U. S. 111.

Proximate Cause---Interventionof Criminal
Cause
Can plaintiff recover damagee for injury resulting from negligence of dependent, when an independent criminal act intervenes between such neglf@n~eand the damage to the plaintiff?
In order to mover, the negligence complained of must have
been the Proximate Cause of the injury. 1
"Proximate cause Is that which in a natural and cbitinuous sequence unbroken by any new cause ~roducesan event and without which the e w n t
would not have oaaurred,"a

1 Code
2 Code
3 Clvil

Georgia, 3427
Georg:a. 3436
Code Georgla Ib10, 2'386

lPcrry v. Central icaitwajr. 66 &a. 178
32 S. E. 77
ZWestern, etc. Ry. Co. Vs. Bailey, 105 G8. 1bO
3 1 S. E. 647
..
.Macon vs. Dykes. 103 Ga. 847
3 1 S. E. 449
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". .
.The injury .must be the natural and probable consequence of
the negligence, such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of
the case might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrong doer a s likely
to flow from the act."B
However, if a criminal cause intervenes between the negligence
and the damage, such negligence is held not to be the proximate
cause of the damage.
The evidence showed that Andrews & Company rented a storehouse from Kinsel who also owned the adjoining storehouse. In
making repairs Kinsel's servants partly removed partition between
the warehouses in making repairs, and when quitting work a t night
negligently left open windows in rear of empty warehouse. Whereupon a burglar entered these windows passed into plaintiff's warehouse through the partition and removed a quantity of the plaintiff'a
goods. Andrews then sued Kinsel for $500.00 damages and the latter
demurred. This demurrer was overruled but the Supreme Court
held on appeal:
"In a suit for damages, where it appears on the fact of the plaintiff's
petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the dependent
and the damage sustained by the plaintiff, the independent criminal act of a
third person, which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the
petition should be dismissed on general demurrer."4

Where the Court said:

.. . .

". . . . . .if it appears that there intervened between the alleged negligence o i the dependent and the damage sustained by the plaintiff the independent criminal act of a th'rd person which was the direct and proximate cause
of the damage, the plaintiff cannot recover."6
In this case the plaintiff's husband, a fireman, was killed when
a switch, negligently left unlocked by the railroad, was turned by a
trespasser on the right of way. Under the above rule she was not
allowed to recover.
This doctrine has also been followed in other cases, towit:
Where the plaintiff was assaulted and knocked against a n elevator door
which the company had negligently allowed t o become insecure so that he
fell into the shaft and was hurt, he could not recover.0
Where the lessee of a Stae Convict negligently allowed him to escape so
that he committed rape, the injured party could not recover from the lessee.
Where a barkeeper unlawfully sold liquor to a person who thereafter quarreled with and killed plaintiff's husband, she could not recover from barkeeper.7

156
3Southern Ry. Co. vs. Webb. 116 a.
42 S. E. 395
4Andrews & Company vs. Kinsel. 114 Ga. 390
40 S. E. 300
4Bowers Admx. vs. Southern Ry. Co. 10 Oa. App. 367 .
73 S. E. 677
5Harper v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills 21 Ga. App. 322
49 S. E. 286
OHenderson vs. Dade Coal Co. et a1 100 Ga. 568
28 S. E. 251
TBelding v. Johnson 86 Ga. 177
12 S. E. 304
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Taxation of Shares of Stock
Judge Cooly in his work on taxation says; "A tax on the shares
of stockholders in a corporation is a different thing from a tax on
the corporation itself, or its stock, and may be laid irrespective of any
taxation of the corporation when no contract relation forbid." The
shares owned by the stockholders are the individual property of the
stockholders, and are liabilities of the corporation and not assets.
The fundamental object sought to be accomplished under the
provisions of our law in relation to taxation is equality, and that the
rich man, the poor man, the ccrporation, the association shall alike
contribute to the support of the Government on the basis of the value
of the property owned, and that all taxation imposed in this State,
shall be on this equatible plan; and any method of taxation which is
not uniform and ad valorem is illegal and contrary to the plain mandates of the law.
The act of 1885 declared that personal property for the purpose
of taxation shall be construed tg include "all stocks and securities,
whether in corporations within the State, or in other States, owned
by the citizens of this State, unless exempt by the laws of the United
States o r of this State." This act in so f a r a s i t relates to the taxation of foreign stock is still in force. Their situs for taxation ia
within limits subject to legislative declaration. "The Legislature
may have the right, under our Constitution to declare that the situa
for taxation of shares of foreign stock held by a resident of Georgia
is not in Georgia, but they clearly have the power to declare that
shares of such stock have a situs for taxation in t.his State." The
General Assembly has so declared,, and residents of this State who
own this class of property must bear the same burden a s is required
of owners of other kind of property. 2
Shares of stock are property in the hands of the shareholder,
still they have no inherent value, and derive their sole value from the
tangible or other property owned by the corporation. The taxation
of both the property of a corporation in the hands of a corporation,
and the value of the shares in the hands of the shareholders, i s a n
instance where the same property is taxed twice. It is double taxation in a sense, but not that species of double taxation which would
be void, i t is permissible, but not compulsary.
The classification of the stocks of a corporation by the laws of
this State, whereby the shares of corporations of this State are exempt and the shares of corporations of other States are liable for
taxation, when owned in this State, is not a n unlawful classification,
nor is i t in violation of the Constitution of this State, neither is such
classification in violation of the 14th amendment to the Federal
Constitution. 3 The location of the assets of the corporation is not
a material fact in determining the liability of the shares of such
corporation for taxation.
Athens Citv PJntermorlrs Co. v. Athens, 74 Georgia 413.
Georgia Rs~ilRoad Co. v. TVriyht, 1 2 5 Georgia 589.
a Coca Cola Co et a1 v. City of A t l s n t ~ .152 Georgia 658.
1
2
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Automobile Law in Criminal Aspect; Issue as to
Negligence of Driver and of Injured Person
Deaths and serious injuries from being run over by automobiles
are of most frequent occurence, the newspapers being constantly filled
with these tragic results of human negligence and diregard for the
rights of others.
A speeding or recklessly driven automobile strikes a pedestrian
in the street. Immediately two questions arise: 1. I s the driver
responsible criminally? and 2. In a civil action by the injured,
more often by his representative, what measure of care must be
shown by pedestrian or driver in order to prevail, when there is a n
issue as to the relative negligence of each?
& to the first question, the case of Dennard v State gives a very
good idea of the driver's responsibility criminally. 1 This was a
case where, on a trial for assault with intent to murder, committed
by running an automobile against and over a person, though the
evidence showed no ill will on the part of accused, i t showed that
he was an expert operator of an automobile, and that there was no
evidence that the machine became unmanageable or skidded, and no
explanation of his conduct was apparent, unless he was actuated by
a reckless disregard for human life, the driver was convicted on the
charge, the Court holding that "the presumption of malice may arise
from a reckless disregard for human 'life, without regard for the
instrumentalities employed to effect a personal injury to another."
In another case the driver of a car was convicted of assault and
battery. He was subtiect to frequent attacks of vertigo which rendered him unable to steer an automobile a t such times. In upholding
the conviction in the lower court the Court of Appeals held that the
defendant's act in undertaking to drive in such a manner, knowing
that he was subject to attacks which rendered him unable to control
a car, was such a disregard of probable consequences as amounted to
criminal negligence as to one who was injured by the defendant's inability to steer his machine. 2
As to the question of the relative negligence of the driver and
of the party killed or injured, in a civil action for damages, the case
of O'dowd v Newnham affords considerable light. 3 In brief, i t
brings out the following points:
1. That a pedestrian's right on the public highway or street is
equal to that of an operator of an automobile, and 2. That both are
bound to use reasonable care and to anticipate the presence on the
streets of others. Of course, what will amount to this degree of
care is a matter for the jury to determine. In this case i t was held
that i t is not by reasonable care on the part of the pedestrian required
that he run to escape injury by an automobile, nor is he requiireid to
be constantly listening and looking to ascertain if cars are approach114 Ga. kpp. 501 (81 S. E. 378)
217 Ga. App. 663
313 Ga. App. 220 (80 S. E. 36)
Code Ga. 1910 Para. 4426
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ing. On the other hand, however, reasonable care on the part of the
operator of an automobile when driving on crowded streets was defined by the Court as "exceeding carefulness," as thoughtless inattention is the essence of negligence.
It has been held erroneous, hourever, to charge that "the degree
of diligence which must be exercised in a particular exigency is such
as is necessary to prevent injuring other,s," this being a greater degree of care than is imposed by law. 4
Certain duties, such as to sounding horns when passing vehicles
and as to speed and etc., are imposed by law on drivers of machines,
and failure to observe these requirements raises the presumption of
negligence. 6
4Giles v. Voiles, 144 Ga. 8.53
Wade C a . 8 2 5 (a) thru 828 (n).

Torts--PartiesPlaintiff In. Action for Death
By Wrongful Act
At Common Law in a civil court the death of a human being
could not be complained of as a n injury. 1 In 1846 Lord Campbell's
Act was passed changing the law of England in this respect and in
1850 Georgia made i t possible for the widow or if no widow then the
child o r children of one unlawfully killed, to recover damages.
In 1887 an Act was passed providing that "the husband may recover for the homicide of his wife and if she leave children (or child)
surviving, said husband shall sue jointly and not separately----The
same Act 2 provides that "a mother or if no mother a father may recover for the homicide of a child, minor or sui juris, upon whom she
o r he is dependent or who contributes to his or her support." All
of these provisions are now included in Section 4424 of the Civil Code
1910. The Supreme Court holds that the "or" in the last sentence
parent who establishes partial
quoted above should be "and."
dependence upon child's labor accompanied by substantial contribution therefrom to his maintenance, may recover.
A father is not
dependent whose earnings are sufficient to support himself though insufficient to support himself and others dependent upon him. s If
the earnings of a mother and child living together are necessary for
the support of both, she is dependent. 6 Where a parent entitled to
bring an action to tort for the homicide of a son dies without having
instituted suit the right of action does not survive to the administrator of such parent. 7 The mother of a n illegitimate child has no
right of action for his homicide.
One standing in loco parentis may

"

IBa!ter 1,. Bolton 1. Carnpbell R. 493.
2Acts of 1887 p 43.
3Clay v. Central R . R. Co. 84 Ga. 345 (1)
4Central of Ga. Rlwy. Co. v. Henson 121 Ga. 463.
5Ga. R. R. Co. v. Spinlts 111 Ga. 571
fiAtlantic Coast Line R ~ v y .Co. v. McDonald 1:s Ga. 635
7Frazier v . Ga. R. R. Co. 101 Ga 77
SRobinson v. t7eorg:a R R. Co. 117 Ga. 168
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recover for the unlawful homicide of a minor but this right depends
on the common law not on the statute.
The right to sue for the homicide of the husband vests in thz
widow a t the death of her husband and is not divested by the subsequent marriage of the widow; 10 and a widow may recover although
she was separated from her husband a t the time of the homicide. l1
The wordjng of the Code leaves room for considerable doubt as
t o whether a child may sue for the homicide of its mother. The Supreme Court has held however that the child will have such a cause
of action provided the father is dead. 12
The General Assembly has recently made two important additions to Section 4424. The Courts had held that an adult child
could not maintain an action for the homicide of its parent; '3 and
further that children adults a t the time of the homicide were not
entitled to share in the proceeds of a judgment obtained by the
widow. 14 An Act 16 of 1924 amends Section 4424 so that "a child
or children, minor o r sui juris," may recover. A quite recent case 10
holds that under this amendment dependency is not essential to recovery by a child whether minor or sui juris. The same Act of the
General Assembly adds the following to the section under discussion:
"In cases where there is no person entitled to sue under the foregoing
provisions of this section the administrator of the deceased person
may sue for and recover for the benefit of the next of kin if dependent upon the deceased or to whose support the deceased contributed.
9City of Albany v. Lindsay 11 Ga. App. 573: Atkinson v. Yarborough 13

Ga. 781.
loGeorgia R. R. and Banking Co. v. Garr 67 GR. 277
1lCentral Rwy. Co. v. Bond 111 Ga. 14
12Atlanta etc. R.R. Co. v. Venable 65 Ga. 55
13Mott v. Central R. R. Co. 70 Ga. 680
14Coleman v. Hyer 113 Ga. 420
15Lnws 1924 p 60
16Peeler v. Central of Ga. Rwy. Co. 137 S. E. 24

RECENT DECISIONS

Recent Decisions
Convegmncea-Reservation

in Deed as to DZinemIs.

Grant vs. Haymes. Supreme Court of Georgia, June 22, 1927. 138 South
Eastern Reporter page 892.
Where the owner of a described tract of land made a Contract of w e ,
a n d executed to the buyer his bond for t.tle, in which he made this provision:
"There is a sand bank on the property to #be conveyed, a n d the right is reserved to remove all of the said sand in said bank, a n d to remove timber growing over said sand bank, so as to better enable him t o get the sand." H e later
died, the executrix and sole legatee oi the grantor, pursuant to his bond, conveyed said land to the grantee, with the same reservat.on of said sand as t h a t
contained in the bond for title,
Deeds-Mines
and Jdmerals Owner may convey fee and lesser right to
sand in cbank on land. "reservation" reserves to grantor some new thing issuing out of thing granted, not in being, i t differs from a n "exception," which
n
"exception" a n d
in p a r t of thing granted: common law d i ~ t ~ n c t i obetween
"reservation" a r e immaterial where Intention is controlling consideration.
Reservation in grantor of sand on land conveyed held not revoked by
grantors death reservation in grantor of sand on land conveyed reserved fee
in sand, though containing no words of inheritance, reservation in grantor of
sand on land conveyed if treated as "exception" reserved, fee in sand passing
to grantors heirs or devisees. Civil Code 1910 section 3659.
We do not think that this reservation is a mere personal privilege or license. A license as a term of real estate law, 1s a n authority to do a particular a c t or series of acts unop another's land without passessing a n y estate
therein. Augusta L Savannah R. X. Co. vs Augusta Southern 1C. R. Co. 96
Georgia page 562.
I t is compelent for one to convey the fee in land to another a n d reserve
the right to sand in a sand bank thereon. See Holmes vs Martin, 10 Georgia
page 503, 506.
While we hold that under this reservation o r exception the title to this
sand remained in the grantor under his bond for title passing to his heirs if
he died intestate, or to his devises if he died testate we do not mean that the
grantor his heirs, or devisees had a n unlimited time i n which to remove this
sand in the sand bank, the language in which this reservation is couched clearly indicates that the grantor was to remove all of t h e sand bank. I n these
circumstances we think the sand should be removed within a reasonable time,
and that upon the failure Of the grantor or those claiming under him t o remove i t within a reasonable time, the right or title to the sand would be divested. See Morgan vs. Perkins. 94 Georgia page 353. 555. 2 1 South Eastern reporter 574, ,575 a s ~ m i ~ circumstance.
ar
Where s clced collreys the timber on land and makes no mention of the
time within which to remove it, the vendee has a reasonable time within which
t o remove the timber. .VAcRae vs Stillwell 111 Georgia, page 65, 36 South Eastern reporter 604.
Stanil~ngtinrber L not personalty but realty, and that a sale of growing
.trees is a sale of an interest In land. Coody v s Gress Lumsber Co. 82 Georgia,
page 793. 10 South Eastern .reporter, page 218.
Supreme Court held, that i t is competent .for the owner of land to convey
the fee thereto to another and reserve the right to the sand in sand bank
thereon. Such reservation did not terminate a t death of grantor, being a fee
in the sand. If the sand was not removed in a reasonable time by grantor, his
heirs of devisees, or those claiming under him, the right or title to the sand
rwould be divested. Judgment reversed.
Common Carriers, Action for Damages.
Central of Georgia Railway Co. vs. Council Brothera. Court of Appeals of
Georgia, March Term 1927.
This was a n action to recover Damages, occasioned ,bya Common Carrier
where i t failed to divert a shipment ,beyond its own lines, although no notice
of the requested diversion was given to the initial carrier.

Where by the terms of its bill of lading the initial c a r r ~ e ragreed to transport a car of peachas from a point in this State to a point in another State,
the transportation to be made over its own lines and those of connecting carriers, the sh.pper if the owner, ha9 the right e s a n incident to the contract of
carriage, before the shipment reached the point of destination named in the
;bill of lading to direct the terminal connecting carrier to divert the shipment
to another place upon its lines; and if such terminal carrier failed to divert the
shipment aa directed by the shipper, in consequence of which the peaches were
damaged, the initial carrier would be liable to the shipper for such damages,
although no notice of the requested diversion was given to the initial carrier.
Under the Carmack amendment to the Interstate Commerce act, a s amended
by the Cummins Act, a n y common carrier subject to the provisions of said
act, receiving goods for transportation from a point in this state to a point in
another state, is required to issue a receipt or bill of lading therefore, and is
liable to the lawful holder thereof for any damage to such property caused by
it or $bya n y common carrier to whlch such property may be delivered or over
whose line, or lines it may pass within the U. S. when transported on a through
bill of lading, and no contract, receipt, rule, regulations or other limitation of
a n y character whatsoever shall exempt such initial carrier from such liability.
A rule of the initial carrier, which stipulated that it would not be liable for a
Iailure to divert a n y shipment, where the shipment has passed beyond its own
1;nes of railway, unless s.uch failure was caused by the negligence of its own
smployees, was void and illegal under the said Carmack amendment, notwithstanding its approval #by the Interstate Commerce Commission." Central
rf Georgia Railway Co. vs. Council Brothers 163 Georgia page 494, 136 South
Eastern reporter page 48, decided by the Supreme Court in answer to a certi!led question by this court.
A common carrier is bound to use extraordinary diligence in transporting
goods accepted by it. I n case of loss or damage of such goods, the presump?ion of law is against the carrier, and no excuse will avail it unless the loss or
damage was caused by the Act of God or the pub1.c enemies of the State. Civ11 Code (910). section 2712. The Act of God means a n y a c t produced by physical causes which a r e inevitable in other words, unavoidable accidents are the
same a s the Acts of God. Fish vs. Chapman 2 Georgia page 349.
I n the'instant case the plaintiff proved damage to the shipments, and the
defendant carrier failed to show t h a t the damage was occasioned by the Act
of God or by the pujblic enemies of the State.
Judgment Affirmed.

I

Landlord and Tenant, Sublease.
Garbutt & Donovan vs. Barksdale Pruitt Junk Co Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2. September 12, 1927.
A lease was made for five years, the tenant made a sublease without t h e
permission of the landlord to the defendant partnership, and it never appeared
that the landlord had ever recognized the defendant partnershib as his tenant.
A lease of real estate for a term less than five years passes no estate out
of the landlord, the tenant has only a usufruct, and he can neither sublet the
premises, convey his usufructuary interest, nor assign his lease without the
landlord's consent. Sealy vs. Kuttner, 41 Georgia, page 594: Hooper vs. Dwinnell, 48 Georgia, page 442, 445; 'Hudson vs. Stewart, 110 Georgia, page 37, 35
South Eastern, page 178; De Foor vs. Stephens, 133 Georgia, page 617, 619, 66
South Eastern page 786.
If with the consent of the landlord, the tenant subrents the rented premises, the subtenant becomes the tenant of the orginal tenant, who is entitled
t o proceed against him for rent under the agreement made between thos parties (Boyd vs. Kinzy, 127 Georgia, page 358, 56 South 'Eastern 420); but the
status of the original tenant with the owner remains the same, and the original
contract between them remains unimpaired. I n such a case the subtenant does
not become the tenant of the owner, and the owner cannot proceed against
him for rent, although in the w e of agricultural lands he would have a specla1 lien o n the crops raised by the subtenant. Hudson vs. Stewart, supra; McConnell vs. East Point Land Co. 100 Georgia, page 129, 134, 28 South Eastern
page 80.

RECENT DECISIONS
If without the consent of the landlord, the tenant should undertake to eublet the premises, .the landlord, not being bound thereby, may ignore such unauthorized agreement without i n a n y wise affecting his rights under his contract with the original tenant, or he may refuse to recognize the right of possession in the subtenant a n d proceed to expel him from the rented premises
as a mere intruder; or he may, a t his option, affirmatively elect to treat such
unauthorized subtenant occupying his premises as his own tenant instead of
the original tenant, in which case the relationship of landlord a n d tenant between the owner and the original tenant ceases. .Such a n election on the part
of the landlord owner whereby the new unauthorized subtenant in substituted
as tenant for the original tenant may .be effected tby a n expressed recognition
'by .the owner of the subtenant a s his tenant, or it may be implied from such
affirmative acts and conduct as will clearly indicate a n intention on the part
of the landlord t o effect such a substitution. Nere acquiescence in the sub,tenant's possession of the rented premises under his agreement with the original tenant does not constitute such a n election; nor will the mere acceptance
of payments by the subtenant in accordance with the terms of the original
contract made with the original tenant be held to constitute a n abandonment
of the contract with the original tenant and the substitution of a new agreement with the subtenant. Cuesta vs. Goldsmith, 1 Georgia Appeal page 48
(I), 57 Southeastern 983; Americus Manufacturing etc., Co. vs. Hightower, 3
Georgia Appeals 65, 59 South Eastern 309; Hooks vs. Bailey 5 Georgia Appeals
211, 62 South -stern
309; Hooks vs. Bailey 5 Georgia Appeals 211, 62 South
Eastern 1054; Mendel vs. Barrett, 32 Georgia Appeal, tr81 (I), 124 South Eastern
107. In order for the acceptance of such ,payments a s made by a n unauthorized
subtenant to have the effect of establishing such a new agreement, it must
clearly appear that it was the intention of the landlord to accept the payments
a s made by the subtenant on his own behalf a s the owner's tenant, instead of
th.rough him for and on #behalf of the original tenant.
I t not appearing in the instant case rnat the landlord had ever recognized
the defendant partnership a s his tenant, and it not appearing that the payments for rent by partnership checks a s made by the member of the partnershi,p .with whom the original written contract of tenancy was made were received a n d accepted as payments made by the partnership a s tenant, the court
did not e r r in granting a nonsuit.
Judgment Affirmed.

Party WaIk-Pmscription-Injunction

Against Cutting Windows.

Levinson v. Goode. Supreme Court of Georgia June 20, 1927. 138 Southeastern Reporter 583.
This is a case where injunction was sought to prevent the defendant from
cutting windows in t h e east wall of his store building, on the ground that said
wall was a "party wall", and no leave had been granted by the plaintiff for
the windows to be cut. The wall divided the store of the plaintiff from that of
,the defendant, both connecting therewith. The defendant sought to cut the
said windows .n the enst wall of the second story of his store building, in order
to convert said story into offices, said windows to loolc out over the roof of
plaintiff's stcre, which was one-story. The petition zr.rleged the stores and brick
wall between had been in existence more than 20 years, and the wall had been
considered as a party wall by them plahtiff and defendant and their respective predecessors in title during the entire period, and t h a t cutting said windows would weaken the wall to the damage of the plaintiff. The defendant
answered, denying that plaintiff had a n y right or title in said wall, alleging
t h a t defendant owned the same in fee simple, and praying the court to enjoin
the plaintiff from interfering with defendant in installing the windows.
The theory of party wall is based on the principle that adjoining landowners owe to each other lateral support of t h e soil in Its natural state. Civil
Code 1910, sec 3619. The parties did not derive title to the respective lots under a common grantor. The claim of Goode is restricted to the rights acquired under 20 years' possession, open, adverse, notorious, under a claim of
right. What was that occupancy? Under the urldisputed evidence, it was
limited to the support Of the connecting walls and the other portions of the
store. "A division wall between two buildings, having for the period of limitations lbeen used for the support of both buildings, becomes in effect a party

,
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wall, whether or not originally constructed a s such, and without any express
agreement by the owners of the buildings." Weadock v. Champe. 160 N. W.
564. This pr-nciple applies generally where the entire wall has been jointly
possessed by borh parties for the recluired length of time. One could not acquire prescriptive title t o a n easement in a wall several hundred feet high or
long, by joining or attaching to such wall a structure 20 or 30 feet high or
long. These figures a r e used for illustration only. The qualified rule has been
well stated in Barry v. Edlavitch, 84 Md. 95, a s follows: "1. The extent of a n
easement to use a wall of a n adjoining owner for the support of a building.
which is acquired by prescription, is the enjoyment of the use of the wall for
the support of the house a s it existed dur.ng the period of prescription. 2.
The owner of a wall which is subject to a n easement #by prescription for the
support of the building of a n adjoining owner has the right, on raising the wall
higher, to the sole use there& unaffected by any easement for the use of the
new portion to support a new story of the house to which the easement belongs.
The facts in the Barry case, just cited, were quite similar to the facts of
this case. and it ruled on the precise question here raised. Following the line
of reasoning in, that case, we find that, under the facts, these conclusions a r e
required. The wall stands on the land of Levinson. The use of the wall by
Goode and his predecessors was of no benefit to the owners of the wall, and
hence i t was a mere burden upon the property, open, adverse, and acquiesced
in. The law implies the grant to do t h e things that have been done for so
long a time that a lawful right h a s *been acquired. I t cannot be presumed
that either party intended t h a t the wall should be a party wall except for the
purpose of supporting the other wall to the extent that it had been supported.
T h a t was, therefore, the extent of the prescriptive right; namely, to enjoy
the use of the wall for the support of the prescribers' house a s it then existed.
The owner of the wall can do with it a s he chooses, provided he does nothing
of detriment to the other's right. I t follows, necessarily, that Goode had no
right in or to t h a t part of the wall which is above the height of his own store,
hnd which is not required for the support of the timbers of his house, and in
placing window openings in the second story portion of the wall, there was
no invasion of the rights of Goode )by Levinson. For these reasons the verdict was unsupported by the evidence, and the court erred in refusing to grant
a new trial.
Judgment-Cause
F o r Setbing Aside. Flanigan v. Hutchins e t al.
preme Court of Georgia. June 1 7 , 1927. 138 Southeastern 793.

Su-

Hutchins filed suit against J. C. Flanigan on a promissory note; said case
being for trial on Dec. 5, 1923. Two days prior to said date Flanigan executed
to his wife a deed conveying property to which he had legal title. Judgment
on the note w m obtained a t the, March, 1924 term of t h e court by Hutchins. A
fi. fa. issuing on said judgment was levied on said property, and Mrs. Flanigan
filed a claim which she later withdrew. The land was advertised for sale;
whereupon Mrs. Flanigan filed a petition malting Hutchins and ~VcGee,sheriff, defendants, seeking to enjoin the sale. The petition alleged that the land
was orig:nally bought by the husband with the funds of the wife: that a t all
times she was the equitable owner thereof; that, upon ascertaining that the
husband had taken title in the deeds, she insisted that he execute the title
t o her, which he did; t h a t Hutchins, after obtaining judgment against the husband, instituted a n equibble suit for the cancellation of the deed from the
husband to her; t h a t plaintiff employed a n attorney, a n d instructed him to
file a defense to the suit of Hutchins for cancellation, upon grounds stated,
but that the answer prepared by counsel was sent to her in a distant part of
the state for verification; that, after said verification, she placed the papers in
the U. S. mail, addressed to the attorney at Winder, Ga.; that the same were
lost, and for this reason were never filed in the court; that, when the suit filed
by Hutchins for cancellation came to be heard, there being no answer thereto
of file, the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, cancelling the deeds, without the introduction of a n y evidence, and t h a t such verdict a n d judgment were
due to "accident in law"; and in her present petition she prays that the last
named judgment and verdict be set aside, to the end that the case for cancellation may be tried, and the issue thereof submitted to a jury for determination,

and that the court enjoin the sale. The exception is to that judgment. Held: 1.
The facts alleged and shown do not constitute equitable cause for setting aside.
t h e judgment. The court was authorized to find that the defendant could
have filed a n answer and obtained a hearing by the exercise of ordinary diligence. Where one has not exercised ordinary diligence, equity will not intervene to set aside the judgment. (a)
2. "In all cases, except actions for unliquidated damages and suits on
unconditional contracts in writing, in the several courts of this state, where
the writ of process has been served, a s the law directs, on the defendant, and
there is no defense made by the party sued, either in person o r ,by attorney, a t
the time the case is submitted for trial, the case shall 'be considered in default,
a n d t h e plaintiff shall be permitted to take a-verdict a s if each and every
item a n d paragraph were proven by testimony." (b)
3. Apply the foregoing principles, the judgment refusing a n injunction
waa not erroroneous.

...............................................................................

(a) Mullins v. Christopher, 36 Ga. 584; Berry v. Burghard, 111 Ga. 117;
Latimer v. Irish-American Bank, 119 Ga. 887.
(b) Civil Code 1910, sec. 5662; Brown v. Hammond, 160 Ga. 446; Glennville, etc., Co. v. Jordan, 144 Ga. 14.
Insurance-Overdue Premiums. Life Insurance Co. v. Bartlett. Court of
Appeals of Georgia. June 14, 1927. 138 5. E. 689.
Suit was brought against the Life Insurance Co. of Virginia u,pon two policies of life insurance issued to the wife of the plaintiff. Under the ruling of
p a t e v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 19 Ga. App. 597, and the facts of ,the
instant case, t h e petition was not subject to general demurrer because it showed that no beneficiary was named in the policies declared upon, and t h a t the
plaintiff was neither the executor nor the administrator of ,his deceased wife's
estate. The request of counsel for the plaintiff in error that the decision in
the Pate case, supra, .be reviewed and overruled is denied.
"Where the insurer, by his custom ancl course of dealing with the insured, i n receming, without objection, premiums o r assessments past due, when
she could have insisted upoi a forfeiture has induced the belief on the part of
the insured premiunis or assessments can ,be paid within a reasonable time aft e r they mature, the insurer cannot claim a forfeiture because, a t the time of
t h e death of the insured, premiums or assessments were due by him which,
had he lived, it is reasonable to suppose it would have ,been accepted upon the
same t e r m a s those upon which other deferred payments had been received." (a)

..............................................................................

(a) Bankers' Health and Life Insurance Co., 35 Ga. App. 666.
Cotton States Life Insurance Co. v. Lester, 62 Ga. 247.
Under this ruling and the facts of the instant case, the insurer cannot
claim forfeiture of the policies because of the failure of the insured to pay one
of the premiums within the times specified in the policies. This is true although each of the po1ic;es contained the following stipulations: "It (the policy) shall be void if many premium shall not be paid according to the terms
thereof: and it is agreed that this provision, which avoids the policy in case
a n y premium shall be overdue, shall not ,be considered in a n y respect waived
by a n y a c t of grace #by the company in the accept of overdue premiums upon
this or a n y other policy."
According to the terms of the policies, they became void upon the failure
of the insured to pay a n y premium within four weeks from t h e date on which
i t was due. However, the petition showed that payments of many premiums
on the policies more than four weeks in arrears, had (been accepted by the
insurer in full satisfaction of such premiums, and that the only payment not
so accepted was made a t the office of t h e district manager of the defendant
company in Macon, Ga., on June 21, 1926, for the premium .due on May 17,
1926, and t h a t this payment was made one o r two days bfeore the death of the
insured. The petition is silent as to the state of health of the insured on
J u n e 21, 1926.
Under the above-stated rulings, t h e court .did not e r r in overruling t h e
demurrer to the amended petition.
Judgment a w m e d . .
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Municipal Corporations-Ordinancea fixing wagea for public work.
A municipal corporation, though not required by the charter to let con-

tracts for a public work to the lowest bidders, and though clothed as to such
matters with the fbroadest discretionary powers, has no authority to adopt a n
ordinance prescribing a fixed scale of wages that shall be paid for all public
work of the city. Such a n ordinance of the city of Atlanta is ultra vires and
illegal, because it tends to encourage monopoly and defeat competition, and
also tends to put a heavier burden upon the taxpayers .than they would have
to .bear of free competition were allowed; and all contracts made in pursuance
thereof a r e void. Wilson vs. City of Atlanta. No. 5762 Supreme Court of
Georgia. 139 Southeastern Reporter 148.
The ordinance in question above was enacted by the mayor and council of
the City of Atlanta on August 16, 1926. The preamble of the ordinance providing for a standard or fixing of proces to be paid a s wag& for skilled laborers in the employ of t h e city or parties making contracts with the city, where
such contracts provide for work or the erection of public buildings and bridges
or repair thereof: and also providing that eight hours will constitute a day's
work for wid laborers deecribed as skilled laborers."
Applying the princigle stated above, the ordinance seeking to fix the scale
of wages of skilled laborers and also to fcx the number of hours constituting a

day's work and made by the mayor and council of the city of Atlanta was held
ultra vires a n d illegal.
The controlling facts in the above cited case a r e very similar to those in
the case of City of Atlanta vs. Stein. 111 Ga. 789.
I n the case of City of Atlanta vs. Stein i t was held that a municipal corporation has no authority to adopt a n ordinance prescribing that all work of a
designated nature shall be given exclusively to persons of a specLfied class.
I n this Instance, the City of Atlanta, by means of a n ordhance had sought to
place all contracts for the printing required by the city, in the hands of union
laborers. The ordinance eliminated all companies using non-union laborers
from taking part in the bidding for such printing contracts.
The similarity is immedlately seen, and like in the first case cited, the
reason for such ordinances being held ultra vires and illegal was because they
tended to encourage monopoly and defeat competition.
Motor Vehicles-Contributory Negligence-Fact

F o r Jury.

Where the driver of a motor truck, traveling on a street in the city of Atlanta, attempted to turn to his right into a n intersecting street without extending his a r m a t a n angle above the horizontal as a signal of his intention
to turn, he was guilty of a violation of a n ordinance of the city; and where the
driver of a n automobile, traveling behind the truck a n d in the same direction,
attempted to pass t h e truck o n the right, in vivlation of another ordinance of
the city, just as the truck began to turn t o its right into the intersecting steet.
and the driver of he following automobile was thereby forced to drive upon
the adjacent sidewalk, and his automobile struck and injured a person upon
the s:dewalk, in a suit brought by the injured person for damages against
both drivers it was not error for the court to overrule the general demurrer
interposed by t h e drive of the truck to the petition, since it was a question of
Tact for the jury whether the negligence of the driver of the truck contributed
concurrently and directly with the negligence of the driver of the truck contrilbuted concurrently and directly with the negligence of the driver of the automobile in causing t h e injuries sued for. No. 18151 Court of Appeals of
Georgia. 139 Southeastern Reporter 156.
I n further support of thls declsion we cite the caae of the Georgia Railway
a n d Power Company vs. Ryan. 24 Ga. App. 288. The determination of questions as t o negligence lies peculiarly within t h e province of the jury, and in
the exercise of this function the question as to what constitutes the proximate
cause of a n injury complained of may be directly involved a s one of the essential elements a n d disputed issues in t h e ascertainment of what negligence,
a s well as whose negligence, the injury is proper@ attributable to.

RECENT DECISIONS
Homicide-Specitlic Intent As Essential Element.
A well settled rule was brought out recently in the case of Springer vs.
t h e State, and Battle vs. Same. No. 18243 Court of Appeals of Georgia. 139
Southeastern Reporter 159.
I t was held in this case that a n essential ingredient of offense of assault
with intent to murder is specific intent to kill.
I n prosecut;on for assault with intent to murder, where there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to show specific intent to kill, and no
evidence authorizing finding that defendants intelltionally committed assault
charged, conviction unauthorized.
T h e court held; Under repeated rulings of the Supreme Court a n d this
court, a n essential ingredient of the offense of assault with intent to murder
is the specific intent to kill. dn neither of the instant cases was there any
evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing or tending to show such a n intent
on the part of the accused. Furthermore there was no evidence authorizing
even a finding that either of the defendants intentionally committed the assault with which they were charged.
I t follows t h a t the verdict in each case for assault with intent to murder
w a s unauthorized, and that the court erred in each case in refusing the grant
of a new trial.
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Handbook of Roman Law
BY MAX RADIN, LLB. PH. D.
Prof. of Law, University of California
Mr. Radin on his exellant treaty on Roman Law primarily arranged the book for the study by lawyers and law students, but i t is
written in such a way that even those that have studied neither L a v
nor Latin can understand his treatment of this comprehensive subj ect-matter.
The book itself is an elementary glance over the great system
which has successfully disputed the domination of the modern world
with the law of England. Mr. Radin stresses the fact that if one
wishes to make any degree of headway, they must first acquire the
language of the men who shaped the Roman Law and enlarge i t to
fulfill its superb destiny,
Only several instances are presented, of the many that might
illustrate the points involved. Perhaps the reasons for selecting
these instances was an attempt to avoid those situations of Roman
social organization which have no real counter-part a t the present
day, the situations, that is, created by the domestic relations of
patria potestas, of guardianship and of slavery. Inevitably only
a distorted picture can be gained, if we push into the background,
what was in the foreground of Roman consciousness; but there may
perhaps be some advantage in maving for the post part among relations familiar to us.
Mr. Radltin takes for granted that his readers are familiar with
Anglo-American Law, and has illustrated Roman concepts by references to the common law more frequently than is generally done in
most books, or than would be advisable if a general audience were
chiefly in view. However, he has made a n effort to use only parallels
which are self explanatory, and does not insist upon them unduly.
The modern method of citation is used in quoting Corpus Juris,
which discards Roman numerals altogether, and gives the book, title,
fragment, and section in that order.
American Law has a connection with Roman Law more intimate
and direct than that derived from our English inheritance. At the
time when the political severance took place, American lawyers and
publicists were not disinclined to look for a broader basis for their
Institutions than the historical fact of their recent membership in
a policy they had rejected. Upon subjects relating to personal con..
tracts and private rights, the Roman law seemed of outstanding
exellence. So we may comprehend the valuable qualities and principles that can be garnered from the study of this broad field of
Law. Particularly is the law field indebted to Mr. Radkin for his
discourse and able treaty of this comprehensive subject.
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American Constitutional Law
BY HENRYCAMPBELL
BLACK,L. L. D.
Author of Black's Law Dictionary, and of Treatises on Judgments,
Bankruptcy, Recision of Contracts, Interpretation of Laws,
Judicial Precidents, etc. West Publishing Company.
As i t is stated in the preface this latest revised edition of Dr.
Black's Handbook of American Constitutional Law was made necessary by the enormous expansion of Constitutional Law in recent years.
The book is one of the Hornbook Series and has the advantage?
of the books of that series. The chapters are divided into numbered
paragraphed; a t the head of which there is a clear resume of the
leading principles in black letter type which is followed by explanatory matter. The paragraphs are quite complete and are written in
a style that is very easy for the student to understand. Dr. Blacl;,
in explaining the principles of our National Constitution and of the
various State Constitutions, has given very full notes indicating the
authorities for his statements.
The book falls into four general divisions although each of these
parts has some things in i t that applies to the other divisions.
The first division contains the first four chapters. The chapters
consider definitions, the nature of and the relations between the
United States and the States, "The Establishment and Amendment of
Constitutions," and the fourth chapter deals with the constructi0n.s
2nd interpretation of Constitutions.
The Second division gives a description of the plan of the Federal Government. Following this plan of the government there are
three chapters, one devoted to each of the three great departments
of the government. Then there are two more chapters, one dealing
with the "Interstate Law as Determined by the Constitution," and
the other with "The Establishment of Republican Government."
The third division considers the State Constitutions as to the
powers of the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative Departments as
granted by the State Constitutions and limited by the Federal Constitutions, and the Acts of Congress.
The last division of the book consists of eleven misceln!neous
chapters, and is the part that is least susceptible to classification.
Some parts of each of these chapters refer to the Federal Constitution and Government, while others refer to the State Constitutions.
These chapters are on: "The Police Power," "The Power of Tnxation", "The Right of Eminent Domain", "Municipal Corporations",
"Civil Rights and Their Protection by the Constitutions", "Eqna!
Protection of the Laws", "Due Process of Law", "Political and Public Rights", "Constitutional Guaranties in Criminal Cases", "Laws
Imparing the Obligation of Contracts", and "Retroactive Laws".
In this division are the two subjects of Constitutional Law that are
the hardest for the student to grasp: "The Police Power" and what
"Due Process of Law" means. Dr. Black gives a masterly treatment
of both of them but especially so of "due process of law". He shows
what "due process of law" is under various circumstances, and renders the idea of it very plain to the student.
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Cases of Trial Practice
Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri
West Publishing Company, 1927
The Author, Dean McBaine, realized that most of our more important devices, employed to conduct a trial, are of English origin.
So, this book, which is one of the American Case Book Series, is a
compilation of English as well as American cases and decisions. The
cases have been limited to major steps that are most frequently taken
in the trial of a cause, and to steps that are common to nearly all
American jurisdictions.
The book includes 368 cases on almost every possible phase of
trial practice. I t begins with cases on the jurisdiction and venue,
terminating with those on rendition, entry and sufficiency of judgments. The cases are introduced in a most logical order-first,
dealing with the Jurisdiction in which suit is brought; next Process, Default Judgments, Judgments without trial of Facts, Change
of Venue, Continuance, The Jury, Sufficiency of Evidence, Opening
Statements, Instructions by the Judge to the Jury, Argument of
Counsel, The Verdict, Trial by Court-without
Jury, New Triala,
Exceptions, and the Renditions, Entry and Sufficiency of Judgments.
In the order that a point might present itself-in that order the case
on that point was included. Citations of cases were made to show
various applications of the rule found in the cases printed.
The student of the subject, a s well a s the practioner will find
this book of considerable practical value.
The selection of cases is, on the whole, commendable. The author has gone through the entire field of his subject, citing modern,
a s well as older leading cases, and always making the points, sought
to be brought out, clear. All in all, Dean McBaine has given us an
admirable compilation.
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Cober's Georgia Evidence
This work will be published in January, 1928. I t is written by
Geo. F. Gober who wrote The Georgia Form Book and Procedure. I t
is an endeavor to present the subject of evidence from the Code and
the decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. The volume will contain about one thousand pages. A distinguished jurist
who has examined the manuscript said i t would be the best and most
helpful book to the Lawyer that had been printed in the State. Many
orders have been received for it. There will be only a limited edition.

